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Abstract 
Do credit ratings help enforce market discipline on banks? Analyzing a uniquely comprehensive 
dataset consisting of 1,081 rating change announcements for 154 international financial institu-
tions between January 2004 and December 2015, we find that rating downgrades for internal rea-
sons, such as adverse changes in the operating performance or capital structure of banks, are asso-
ciated with a significant CDS spread widening. However, this widening only occurs for banks that 
are not perceived as to be Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF). Our findings question the reliability of credit 
ratings as a tool to discipline TBTF banks and suggest that regulatory monitoring should remain 
the main mechanism for disciplining these banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit ratings play a significant role for banks as they provide important information on the overall 
riskiness of a bank to investors and its counterparties. If the rating of a bank is low, its refinancing 
costs will be high, while it may simultaneously lose business to other banks due to its high coun-
terparty risk.1 Therefore, having a comparatively high and stable rating is of great importance for 
any financial institution. 
However, banks (not unlike any other rated entities) are often only partially able to influence their 
own credit rating. A bank’s rating can, for example, be tied to the sovereign rating of the country 
(in which the bank has its main operations) due to the sovereign rating ceiling.2 Moreover, a dete-
riorating economic environment or changes to the methodology CRAs use to rate financial insti-
tutions are also beyond the control of banks and may lead to adverse rating changes (e.g., King, 
Ongena and Tarashev, Forthcoming). Nevertheless, even though banks operate in a highly cyclical 
environment, they still have the ability to influence certain factors that determine their rating. 
In this study, we therefore test whether market discipline is relevant for Too-Big-to-Fail banks and 
how implicit TBTF guarantees may affect credit default swap (CDS) markets in particular. Partic-
ularly in the context of market discipline, credit ratings play a major role because they factor into 
the calculation of capital requirements for interbank claims and serve as a benchmark for the in-
ternal rating approach (see e.g., Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2006, 2011). The imme-
diate motivation for our study is that a bank that is considered systemically important, however, 
                                                 
1 In this context, the ratings provided by credit rating agencies (CRAs) are seen as a tool to impose market discipline 
on banks (Billett, Garfinkel and O’Neal, 1998), which supplements regulatory discipline as one of the three pillars of 
financial sector regulation (e.g., Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2006, 2011). 
2 Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s somewhat relaxed their country risk ceilings, effectively allowing firms to 
have higher ratings than the sovereign rating of their home country (see e.g., Moody’s, 2015; Standard & Poor’s, 
2013). It is, however, still not a common occurrence. 
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may not need to make any adjustments even if it was downgraded for internal reasons, because 
changes to its credit rating may not matter much as a result of an implicit assumption by market 
participants that the bank will be bailed out by the government if there is a threat of bankruptcy 
(e.g., Hett and Schmidt, 2017).3 
We use CRAs’ credit rating announcements, i.e., rating downgrades or upgrades, as easily visible 
events to market participants, to investigate whether the creditworthiness of a bank is increasing 
or deteriorating. We analyze the reaction of the banks’ CDS spreads, which are a direct measure 
of a bank’s creditworthiness and default probability. The CDS market is viewed as one of the most 
prevalent channels through which new, credit relevant information can be transmitted and which 
contains unique firm information that is not captured by other markets (Lee, Naranjo, Velioglu, 
2018). Indeed, given its informed trading (Acharya and Johnson, 2007), any deterioration or im-
provement in a bank’s creditworthiness should therefore immediately be reflected in a widening 
or tightening of the CDS spreads. Consequently, examining the CDS market as one of the most 
prevalent, market-based measures of credit risk offers valuable insights into the way market par-
ticipants evaluate rating changes in light of potential TBTF considerations. 
Prior research on the effect of rating change announcements on firms’ CDS spreads generally doc-
uments a significant widening of CDS spreads as a result of credit rating downgrades.4 The ma-
jority of prior studies, however, does not focus on one specific industry or the financial sector in 
                                                 
3 TBTF was first acknowledged by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency in 1984 following a U.S. Senate hearing 
when he defended the bailout of Continental Illinois by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the U.S. gov-
ernment. Since then, research on the existence, effects, and consequences of TBTF increased significantly (e.g., 
O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Morgan and Stiroh, 2005; Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013). 
4 For example, Hull, Predescu and White (2004), Norden and Weber (2004), Galil and Soffer (2011), Finnerty, Miller 
and Chen (2013), and Norden (2017). In contrast, for rating upgrades, the majority of prior studies fails to observe a 
significant CDS market reaction to rating upgrade announcements (Hull et al., 2004; Norden and Weber, 2004) and 
only more recent evidence points to a small, but significant, tightening of CDS spreads following a rating upgrade 
(Finnerty et al., 2013; Galil and Soffer, 2011). 
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particular, thereby neglecting the possibility that, for example, rating announcements for closely 
regulated banks may lead to different CDS market reactions. TBTF considerations are strongest in 
the banking sector and the expectation of a government bailout in case of financial distress may 
shape investors’ reactions to downgrade announcements in particular. Especially for TBTF banks, 
rating downgrades may not serve as an appropriate channel through which market discipline can 
be exerted on banks given the existence of implicit TBTF guarantees by governments. As the 
studies of Rime (2005) and Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2013) document, the credit ratings of large 
banks are distorted as a result of TBTF considerations. As a consequence, the CDS spreads of 
TBTF banks may not widen appropriately following a rating downgrade due to expectations of 
government bailouts. Therefore, studying the effect of rating changes on the CDS spreads of fi-
nancial institutions will offer valuable insights into the efficacy of rating changes as an appropriate 
channel through which market discipline is enforced on financial institutions. A potential break 
down of one of the mechanisms of market discipline inevitably questions the viability of credit 
ratings as an appropriate tool to discipline banks for excessive risk taking and should consequently 
be a concern to regulators and policy makers alike. 
We analyze the effect of TBTF considerations on credit rating changes for financial institutions in 
two steps. First, we examine how banks’ CDS spreads react to rating change announcements, de-
pending on the reason of the rating change. It may well be that the CDS spread reactions differ if 
the rating changes are due to external reasons outside the direct control of the bank, such as a 
deteriorating economic climate or changes to the CRA’s rating methodology, or internal reasons 
within the purview of a bank, such as a poor operating performance. Second, we investigate 
whether TBTF benefits exist in debt capital markets by differentiating between CDS spread reac-
tions of TBTF and non-TBTF banks to rating downgrades. Rating downgrades may have a limited 
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effect on the perceived creditworthiness of TBTF banks, rendering downgrades an ineffective 
mechanism for the enforcement of market discipline. 
We construct a uniquely comprehensive dataset consisting of 1,081 rating change announcements, 
782 rating downgrades and 299 rating upgrades, for 154 international financial institutions be-
tween January 2004 and December 2015. The analysis of the CDS spread reaction to rating 
changes reveals that only rating downgrades due to internal reasons, such as adverse changes in 
the operating performance or capital structure of the bank, are associated with a large and signifi-
cant widening of CDS spreads. For TBTF banks, however, rating downgrades attributed to internal 
reasons do not lead to any CDS spread changes, while a significant widening of CDS spreads is 
observed for non-TBTF institutions. The results also hold after controlling for other factors that 
may influence the CDS spread reaction to rating changes, such as a bank’s initial rating or its 
leverage. The loading factors for the variables in the regression analysis suggest that, all else being 
equal, following a rating downgrade due to internal reasons, the CDS spread of a non-TBTF bank 
will widen approximately 67 basis points (bps) more than the CDS spread of a TBTF institution. 
This, for example, implies that for a non-TBTF bank with a letter rating equivalent to an A, the 
CDS spread will widen by roughly 86 bps, compared to 19 bps for a TBTF bank in case of a one 
notch rating downgrade. The results are robust to different methodology specifications, such as 
alternative empirical approaches, model specifications and time-varying changes in the regulatory 
environment. 
Our findings make multiple contributions to the existing literature. First, we contribute to the em-
pirical literature on TBTF by analyzing whether the effects of credit rating downgrades differ de-
pending on the importance of banks. By investigating the CDS market reaction for TBTF and non-
TBTF banks to credit rating changes, we go beyond investigating the effect of bank size on rating 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928113 
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levels (e.g., Völz and Wedow, 2011; Ueda and Weder di Mauro, 2013) and directly test whether 
size influences the market reaction itself. We document that TBTF banks, which are larger and 
more important, possess a comparative advantage in credit markets over their smaller peers. Third, 
and most importantly, by showing that TBTF banks’ CDS spreads are not affected by rating down-
grades, we present novel evidence that rating downgrades are not an appropriate mechanism 
through which market discipline can be enforced on banks. This breakdown in one of the mecha-
nisms of market discipline questions the viability of credit ratings as a tool to curb banks’ excessive 
risk taking and highlights the importance of regulatory discipline as the main mechanism for mon-
itoring TBTF banks. Second, we add to prior research on the effects of rating announcements on 
the CDS spreads of firms (e.g., Hull. et al., 2004; Norden, 2017). By focusing exclusively on fi-
nancial institutions, we are able to offer new insights into the importance of the reasons for rating 
announcements and how they affect the refinancing costs of firms. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and methodology 
and Section 3 presents the empirical results on the effect of rating changes on banks’ CDS spreads, 
depending on the reason of the rating announcements. Section 4 provides an analysis of the differ-
ential impact of rating downgrades on the CDS spreads of TBTF and non-TBTF banks, while 
Section 5 provides several robustness tests, including a comparative analysis of the stock and bond 
market reactions. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Sample construction 
Our analysis is based on a global sample of banks with a long-term issuer rating by S&P, Moody’s 
and/or Fitch with CDS spread data available through Thomson Reuters Composite EOD. Thomson 
Reuters offers data on CDS spreads beginning in 2004 and our analysis covers the 12-year time 
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period from January 2004 to December 2015.5 We focus our study exclusively on banks and bank-
ing related institutions (primary Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes from 6000 to 6289 
and SIC codes 6712 and 6733), as these firms are at the center of discussion with regard to TBTF 
policies. Using these criteria, we exclude all insurance carriers, real estate companies, non-bank 
holding companies, and other miscellaneous investment companies. This approach is in line with, 
among others, Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2013) and Gandhi and Lustig (2015). In total, we were 
able to retrieve CDS data for 234 different financial institutions from Thomson Reuters, of which 
212 had a long-term issuer rating from at least one of the three major CRAs.6 We use the long-
term issuer rating of banks, which combine standalone ratings and the probability of extraordinary 
sovereign support, as opposed to only the standalone ratings for two main reasons.7 First, King et 
al. (Forthcoming) find evidence that standalone ratings or refinements of these ratings have a lim-
ited effect at best on the all-in ratings of financial institutions. Second, Fitch revised its measure-
ment scale in 2011, while S&P did not publish standalone ratings prior to the fourth quarter of 
2011, raising potential comparability and data availability issues. Therefore, long-term issuer rat-
ings are preferable for the purpose of this study. In a next step, we collected all the relevant press 
releases for each rating change from the website of the respective CRA.8 
                                                 
5 Mayordomo, Pena and Schwartz (2014) find some evidence that the CDS data quality can vary across different 
sources between January 2004 and March 2010. Yet, they nevertheless confirm that Thomson Reuters EOD is a viable 
source for CDS data. It should also be noted that the investigation period of Mayordomo et al. (2014) ends in March 
2010, whereas ours extends well beyond that and ends in December 2015. In fact, more than half of our observations 
take place between 2011 and 2015. 
6 Using this selection procedure implies that we use the CDS data for all banks available through Thomson Reuters 
EOD. This gives us the largest possible sample for our investigation and allows us to conduct a thorough analysis on 
the effect of credit rating changes on an international sample of banks. 
7 The long-term issuer rating, also called the all-in-rating, combines a bank’s standalone rating with the CRA’s esti-
mate of the probability and magnitude of extraordinary support, either by the bank’s home country or it ultimate parent 
company. The standalone rating only aims at measuring a bank’s intrinsic financial strength and therefore its ability 
and/or willingness to repay its debt. For a further discussion see also King et al. (Forthcoming). 
8 Some of the relevant credit rating announcements for S&P were collected from the Alacra website 
(http://www.alacrastore.com). 
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We identified a total of 3,393 rating change and rating review announcements by S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch between the years 2004 and 2015. The total sample is split into 2,186 rating downgrade 
and rating review for downgrade announcements and 1,207 rating upgrade and rating review for 
upgrade announcements. Figure 1 shows the total number of rating downgrades and upgrades dur-
ing our entire investigation period. On average, each bank in our sample receives approximately 7 
downgrades and 4 upgrades over all three major CRAs, which equals one rating announcement 
every 7 months. The average time period between two announcements is 272 trading days with a 
median of 120 trading days. Most rating downgrades occur between the third quarter of 2008 and 
the second quarter of 2009, the height of the recent financial crisis. Prior to the crisis, upgrades 
occurred more frequently than downgrades and a spike in the number of upgrades can be observed 
during the second quarter of 2007, just before the start of the financial crisis. During the crisis, 
very few rating upgrades are observed. Following the crisis, still fewer rating upgrades than down-
grades are observed. Moreover, the number of rating downgrades spiked again during the fourth 
quarter of 2011 and the second quarter of 2012, the height of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Particularly Greek and Spanish banks were frequently downgraded, their average rating decreased 
by 7 and 5 notches, respectively. Since the third quarter of 2012, the number of downgrades ap-
pears to have stabilized. Figure 1 also shows that the average bank rating increased between 2004 
and the first quarter of 2008 from A-/A3 to A/A2. However, following the financial crisis, the 
average rating decreased by more than two notches and stood at BBB+/Baa1 at the end of 2015. 
This is an indication that CRAs started to more carefully assess the credit risks of banks in the 
wake of the financial crisis and are now less willing to provide high credit ratings. This is in line 
with the findings of Dimitrov, Palia and Tang (2015) who show that after the Dodd-Frank act 
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CRAs issue lower ratings. Moreover, the finding is also in line with the reputation model devel-
oped by Morris (2001), suggesting that CRAs in the post-Dodd-Frank period may be more protec-
tive of their reputation. It is, however, noteworthy that the average rating of a non-US and non-
European financial institution increased by roughly 1 notch during our observation period, possi-
bly reflecting the increased importance of banks headquartered outside of the U.S. and Europe. 
[Please insert Figure 1 around here] 
Our starting sample contains all 3,393 rating review and rating change announcements by the three 
major CRAs for our sample of 212 financial institutions. As the focus of the present study is on 
the CDS market reaction to rating change announcements, we drop all rating reviews from our 
sample in a first step. Next, all events are dropped for which CDS data is not available or not in 
sufficient quality during the estimation or event period. In a further step, we eliminate all events 
for which the reason for the rating change could not be properly determined. Finally, we exclude 
all events for which accounting data for the subsequent regression analyses are missing. This 
leaves us with a final sample of 1,081 rating change announcements for 154 different financial 
institutions, of which 28 are considered TBTF, from 36 different countries for our analysis: 782 
rating downgrades and 299 rating upgrades (Table A.1 in the Appendix offers a detailed overview 
of the number of events by country and year).9 Table 1 provides an overview of the sample selec-
tion procedure. 
                                                 
9 TBTF appears to be universal phenomena and in this context national regulatory systems only play a subordinated 
role. The G-SIBs, for example, are compromised of the globally largest financial institutions, irrespective of their 
country of origin and regulation of these institutions goes beyond the national level. Furthermore, prior research also 
does not differentiate between different legal systems (e.g., Cubillas, Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2017; Ueda and Weder 
di Mauro, 2013), thereby acknowledging the universality of TBTF. 
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[Please insert Table 1 around here] 
In line with Goh and Ederington (1993), Bannier and Hirsch (2010), and Imbierowicz and Wahren-
burg (2013), we explicitly focus on the reason behind a rating announcement. We allocate the 
rating change announcements into either internal or external reasons. Both reasons are divided into 
three subcategories. Internal reasons are rating announcements due to changes in capital structure, 
operating performance, or M&As, while external reasons are a result of circumstances that are 
outside the direct control or influence of the bank. They are further divided into rating announce-
ments due to changes in the macroeconomic or regulatory environment, adjustments to the sover-
eign rating, and changes in the methodology the CRA uses to assess the banks’ ratings. We use 76 
keywords that are frequently mentioned as a reason and sort them in order of appearance in the 
press release of the CRA (see also Table A.2 in the Appendix for a full list of all keywords by 
category). In case more than one keyword appeared in the press release, we follow Imbierowicz 
and Wahrenburg (2013) and assign the event to the first keyword mentioned in the press release 
and allocate the keywords to one of the six categories.10 
Goh and Ederington (1993) divide rating announcements into two broad categories: deterioration 
or improvement in the firm’s earnings and in actions or decisions that result in a change in the 
firm’s leverage. Both categories are part of our internal reasons. We add rating change announce-
ments because of merger activity to our internal reasons, as M&As are usually actively pursued by 
a firm and can affect the operating performance and capital structure of a company in multiple 
ways. In contrast, external reasons are a result of circumstance that are outside the direct control 
                                                 
10 If a press release did not explicitly include one of the keywords, the announcement was manually matched to the 
closest category. In case the announcement did not fit into any of the six categories, it was dropped from the sample 
(see also Table 1). This, however, happened only in 4 cases for rating downgrades. 
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or influence of the bank. These include an improvement or deterioration in the economic climate 
or changes in the overall regulatory framework, adjustments to the CRAs’ rating methodology, 
and rating changes due to adjustments in the sovereign rating of the country in which the bank has 
its main operations or headquarter. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the different reasons for the rating change announcement by year. 
373 (35%) of the events in the sample are due to internal reasons, while 708 (65%) events are due 
to external reasons. This already shows that approximately two thirds of the rating change an-
nouncements are outside of the direct control of the bank. Table 2 Panel A displays the number of 
downgrades. 540 downgrades are a result of external reasons, while the remaining 242 downgrades 
are due to internal reasons. Table 2 Panel B shows the number of upgrades by year. Approximately 
50% of all upgrades occurred prior to the financial crisis, particularly during the years 2006 and 
2007. This is in line with the observation in Figure 1 that the average bank rating underwent a 
pronounced increase during those years. Rating upgrades are largely driven by reasons outside of 
the direct control of the bank, as upgrades due to adjustments in the CRAs’ rating methodology 
and due to sovereign rating changes account for 153 of the 299 upgrades in our sample. Overall, 
the distribution of rating changes by year and reasons underlines the highly cyclical business of 
firms operating in the financial sector. 
[Please insert Table 2 around here] 
2.2 Empirical methodology 
We use CDS spreads to determine the debt market reaction to rating announcements. CDS are a 
viable, market-based measure of the credit risk of firms and are extensively used by investors in 
order to hedge and invest in credit risk (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2013). One of the main advantages 
of CDS is the ease with which to buy credit protection compared to shortening bonds. In addition, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928113 
12 
prior research documents that information in the CDS market tends to spill over to bond spreads 
(Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 2005), that CDS generally reflect new information more quickly 
than bond markets (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005) and also contain unique information 
not readily present in other markets (Lee et al., 2018). 
In line with the vast majority of existing literature, we use the five-year tenor senior CDS mid 
spread in U.S. dollars (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005; Jorion and Zhang, 2007; Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2013) as it is by far the most commonly traded and liquid tenor in the market. 
We analyze CDS spread changes as a measure for the daily change in the credit risk of a bank as 
the goal of this study is to document the changes in banks’ CDS spreads subsequent to rating 
announcements. Following, among others, Jorion and Zhang (2007) and Norden (2017), we use 
daily absolute spread changes ,  for bank i at time t: 
, ≡ , , , (1) 
where ,  is the CDS spread in bps, for bank i’s CDS on day t. Rating announcements for banks 
are frequently clustered and heavily depend on the sovereign rating of the bank’s country of 
origin.11 We therefore refrain from using a benchmark adjusted model and estimate adjusted CDS 
spread changes on the basis of a constant spread change model. This model has the distinct ad-
vantage that we do not need a proxy for a market portfolio, thereby avoiding any potential biases 
                                                 
11 See for example the downgrade of Greece banks following the rating downgrade of Greece 
(https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-to-review-six-Greek-banks-for-possible-downgrade--PR_198269). In 
addition, in light of the recent financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, CRAs made adjustments to the 
methodology they use for rating financial institutions. See for example https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-
reviews-global-bank-ratings--PR_321005 for adjustments to the rating methodology Moody’s uses to assess the credit 
ratings of banks. 
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in calculating the benchmark if multiple firms are affected simultaneously. We follow Handjini-
colaou and Kalay (1984) for bond spreads and Schäfer, Schnabel and Weder di Mauro (2016) for 
CDS spreads and estimate a constant spread change model using: 
, ≡ , , | , (2) 
where , , ,  and , |  are the adjusted, realized, and normal spread changes, respec-
tively, for bank i’s CDS on day t. The normal spread change is the expected spread change condi-
tional on the information set  and is estimated using a 120-trading day period prior to the first 
day of the event window: 
, | , 1120 , (3)
We calculate cumulative adjusted CDS spread changes (CASCs) by adding daily ASCs from day 
τ1 to τ2. CASCs are computed for each day of the event window [τ1; τ2] in [-10…,+10]. In order to 
test whether the mean CASCs differ significantly from 0, we use the standard cross-sectional par-
ametric t-test as well as the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The difference between two 
samples are tested using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test. 
3. The effect of credit rating changes on banks’ CDS spreads 
Table 3 shows the results for rating downgrade announcements. For the entire sample of rating 
downgrades, a significant widening of CDS spreads can be observed, particularly during the [-
5;+5] day event window (Table 3 Panel A), with the mean CASC amounting to 12.32 bps. It is, 
however, noteworthy that this widening can only be observed for the mean CASC, while the me-
dian CASC is negative and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test remains insignificant. 
[Please insert Table 3 around here] 
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By further dividing the sample into downgrade announcements due to internal reasons (Table 3 
Panel B) and external reasons (Table 3 Panel C), deeper insights can be gained into the way bank 
credit rating downgrades are evaluated. Downgrades as a result of internal reasons lead to a highly 
significant widening of CDS spreads of 44.20 bps during the [-10;+10] day event window and 
50.53 bps during the [-5;+5] day event window, respectively. The median CASCs are lower, but 
still positive and the t-statistic as well as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicate high levels of 
significance. Rating downgrades due to external reasons, in contrast, are associated with a signif-
icant tightening of CDS spreads during the [-10;+10] day event window, as the mean and median 
CASC of -10.19 bps and -4.81 bps document. This tightening is, however, small compared to the 
widening of CDS spreads observed following downgrades due to internal reasons. There is some 
evidence that in the case of external reasons for downgrade, a large part of the adjustment to the 
CDS spread takes place during the [+1;+5] day event window following the downgrade announce-
ment, indicating that CDS market participants take some time to incorporate the new information 
into the banks’ CDS spreads.12 Moreover, the difference between rating downgrades due to inter-
nal and external reasons is highly significant for almost all event windows (Table 3 Panel D). 
Table 4 shows the CDS event study results for rating upgrade announcements. For the entire sam-
ple of rating upgrades, a small, but significant tightening of CDS spreads can be observed. How-
ever, compared to rating downgrades, the effect of rating upgrades is low and no significant CDS 
spread changes can be observed during the [-10;+10] day event window, suggesting that rating 
upgrades have little to no impact on banks’ CDS spreads. 
                                                 
12 The tightening of CDS spreads appears to be largely driven by downgrades following changes in the methodology 
used by the CRAs (see also Figure A.1 in the Appendix). In this instance it may be that the rating downgrades are less 
severe than initially communicated by the CRAs and anticipated by market participants. 
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Splitting the sample of upgrade announcements into upgrades due to internal reasons (Table 4 
Panel B) and external reasons (Table 4 Panel C) again offers deeper insights. Contrary to expecta-
tions, rating upgrades as a result of internal reasons lead to a significant widening of the banks’ 
CDS spreads. Simultaneously, the results also show a significant tightening of CDS spreads on the 
announcement day of the rating upgrade. However, as the change in the mean and median CASC 
is less than 1 bp, the effect is negligible. In contrast, rating upgrade announcements due to external 
reasons are associated with a significant tightening of CDS spreads, concentrated on the [-5;+5] 
and [-1;+1] day event windows with a mean CASC of approximately -3 bps. These CDS spread 
changes, however, are still small and again indicate the limited impact that rating upgrades have 
on the CDS spreads of financial institutions. The difference in the CASCs between upgrade an-
nouncements due to internal and external reasons are only significant during the [-5;+5] day event 
window (see Table 4 Panel D).13 
[Please insert Table 4 around here] 
Overall, credit rating downgrades of banks lead to a large, significant widening of CDS spreads, 
while rating upgrades are only associated with small and at best weakly significant tightening of 
CDS spreads. This finding, and the asymmetric nature of the CDS market reaction to rating change 
announcement, is in line with large parts of the literature (e.g., Hull et al., 2004; Finnerty et al., 
2013). Figure 2 illustrates this result. The results, however, also document that the widening of 
CDS spreads following rating downgrades is entirely driven by downgrade announcements due to 
                                                 
13 Table A.3 and Table A.4 in the Appendix provide an overview of the CDS market reaction to downgrades and 
upgrades, respectively, divided into the six different reasons. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928113 
16 
internal reasons (see also Figure 2 Panel A). Rating upgrade announcements due to external rea-
sons are associated with a small, but significant tightening of CDS spreads, while rating upgrades 
for internal reasons lead to a small widening of CDS spreads (see also Figure 2 Panel B). Yet, 
compared to the CDS market reaction to rating downgrades, the reaction to rating upgrades can 
considered to be negligible.14 
[Please insert Figure 2 around here] 
4. The impact of rating downgrades on the CDS spreads of Too-Big-to-Fail versus regular 
banks 
The previous section clearly demonstrated that only rating downgrade announcements attributed 
to internal reasons lead to clear CDS market reactions. The CDS market reaction to rating upgrades 
is negligible compared to downgrades. We therefore forgo a deeper analysis of the effect of rating 
upgrades and largely concentrate our further examinations on the impact of TBTF rating down-
grade announcements. Focusing on internal reasons has the additional advantage that these down-
grade announcements relate to a single bank only, which allows for clearer conclusions with regard 
to the effect of TBTF consideration on the CDS spread of financial institutions. Rating change 
announcements due to external reasons usually affect a large number of banks simultaneously, 
which in turn may blur results and therefore not allow for a clear isolation of the effect of TBTF. 
In particular, we anticipate that rating downgrade announcements for banks that are considered 
TBTF will have little to no impact on the CDS spreads of these institutions, as market participants 
                                                 
14 Figure A.1 in the Appendix provides for a graphical illustration of the results by the six different reasons for rating 
changes. 
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are likely to expect a government bailout in case the bank faces bankruptcy. For non-TBTF banks, 
on the other hand, we expect a significant widening of CDS spreads. 
In this context, the definition of TBTF is important in order to properly assess the effect of TBTF 
considerations on rating changes. Prior research that focused exclusively on the U.S. frequently 
used the 11 largest banks by assets to define TBTF banks (e.g., O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Morgan 
and Stiroh, 2005). For international samples, the more recent definition of Global Systemically 
Important Banks (G-SIBs) 15 is often used (e.g., Bongini, Nieri and Pelagatti, 2015; Moenninghoff, 
Ongena and Wieandt, 2015). The size of a bank’s total assets is clearly important to be perceived 
as being TBTF, and several studies that use samples consisting of international banks (e.g., 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013; Cubillas et al., 2017) focus on some measures based on total 
assets. As we likewise have an international sample of financial institutions from 36 different 
countries, we define TBTF by the total assets of a bank in its country of origin relative to other 
banks in that country. In particular, we treat a bank as being TBTF if it was among the three largest 
banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the 
rating change. We believe it is reasonable to assume that a national government would not allow 
one of the three largest financial institution in the country to fail, as the repercussion for the finan-
cial system are potentially too severe, thereby justifying a government bailout. This definition of 
TBTF is also used by Cubillas et al. (2017). 
4.1 CDS event study results 
Table 5 presents the results of the CDS event study comparing rating downgrades due to internal 
reason for TBTF and non-TBTF banks. It can clearly be seen that the CDS market reaction to 
                                                 
15 G-SIBs and Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) are frequently used interchangeably, but the latter 
term is generally defined somewhat more broadly and includes other financial intermediaries, such as insurance com-
panies and market infrastructure providers. 
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rating downgrades for TBTF banks is small and largely insignificant (see Table 5 Panel A). There 
appears to be a weakly significant widening in CDS spreads for TBTF banks during the [-30;-11] 
day event window, which may indicate some information leakage, but the spread changes are com-
paratively small.16 In contrast, the CDS spreads of non-TBTF banks undergo a significant widen-
ing during almost all event windows (see Table 5 Panel B). The mean CASC amounts to 69.43 
bps and 74.12 bps during the [-10;+10] and [-5;+5] day event window, respectively. There appears 
to be some information leakage prior to the official rating downgrade announcement, as the CASC 
during the [-5;-1] day event window is significant, but there are no significant spread changes 
during the [-30;-11] day event window, suggesting that there is little leakage overall. Moreover, 
the reaction on the announcement day and during the [+1;+5] event window are also highly sig-
nificant. This suggests that CDS market participants are not able to properly assess the true effect 
of the rating downgrade prior to the actual downgrade announcement. 
[Please insert Table 5 around here] 
The difference between the CDS market reaction to rating downgrade announcements between 
TBTF and non-TBTF banks is also very pronounced (see Table 5 Panel C). With the exception of 
the announcement day and the [-30;-11] and [-1;+1] day event windows, respectively, the mean 
and median CASC are significantly lower for TBTF banks than for non-TBTF banks. The differ-
ence in the mean CASC amounts to -76.30 bps during the [-10;+10] day event window, giving a 
strong indication that CDS market participants distinguish between banks that are likely to receive 
a bailout by their country’s government in case they experience financial distress and those that 
                                                 
16 We also calculate the CASC for the [-30;-11] day event window in this section and several of the following sections 
in order to alleviate concerns with regard to potential leakage. For this event window the expected spread changes  
are computed using a 120-trading day period from t=-150 to t=-31. 
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are unlikely to receive such a treatment. The assumption of TBTF status by CDS market partici-
pants leads to a very subdued market reaction for TBTF banks, providing evidence that the market 
discipline mechanism, which downgrades by CRAs should provide, is actually not functioning 
properly or not present at all.17 
Figure 3 Panel A illustrates the CDS spread development for TBTF and non-TBTF banks during 
the [-30;+10] day event window for internal downgrade reasons. There is a very pronounced wid-
ening of CDS spreads for non-TBTF banks, starting approximately five days prior to the rating 
downgrade announcement and ending five days following the rating announcements. In stark con-
trast, the CDS spreads of the TBTF banks remain comparatively stable and show no distinct pattern 
overall.18 Figure 3 Panel B shows the CDS spread development for external downgrade reasons 
divided into TBTF and non-TBTF banks. It can be seen that the tightening of CDS spreads is 
driven by non-TBTF banks following the downgrade announcements. This tightening may be due 
to market participants anticipating multi-notch downgrades, which subsequently did not occur. 
[Please insert Figure 3 around here] 
4.2 Regression results 
The observed CDS spread changes following rating downgrade announcements may be driven by 
more factors than just TBTF considerations. In order to account for these factors, we run several 
regressions to determine the impact of different definitions of TBTF on our results and of other 
                                                 
17 Table A.5 in the Appendix shows the difference between TBTF and non-TBF banks for rating downgrades due to 
external reasons. For external reasons, the tightening of CDS spreads is largely driven by non-TBTF banks, while for 
TBTF banks largely insignificant and negligible reactions are observed. 
18 The results also hold when splitting the sample of rating downgrades for internal reasons into different regions and 
countries (see Figure A.2 in the Appendix). Noting the comparatively small sample sizes, the difference in absolute 
spread changes between TBTF and non-TBTF banks varies between the different regions and countries and down-
grades appear to matter more to TBTF banks in smaller countries (e.g. the Netherlands and Italy). 
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rating-, event-, and bank-specific variables, including the most prominent variables used in prior 
literature. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression takes the following form: 
, ;	 α βTBTF , TBTF , INTERNAL , Y , , ψZ , 	 (4) 
where , ;	  is the dependent variable, which is either the bank i’s CASC during the [-
10;+10] (CASCi,[-10;+10]) or [-5;+5] (CASCi,[-5;+5]) event window. The independent variables are 
divided into TBTF-related variables, rating-specific variables, event-specific variables, and bank-
specific variables. The TBTF-related variables include TBTF, a binary variable equal to 1 if a bank 
was among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by total assets at the end of 
the year prior to the rating change announcement (which is our default TBTF definition), and equal 
to 0 otherwise.19 As alternative definitions for TBTF, we use the variables TBTF1 and TBTF5, 
both also binary variables that take the value of 1 if the bank was the largest bank or among the 
five largest banks as measured by total assets in its country of origin at the end of the year prior to 
the rating change announcement, respectively, and take the value of 0 otherwise. In addition, we 
included the interaction term TBTF X INTERNAL to test whether the CDS market reaction of 
TBTF-banks differs significantly from the one of non-TBTF banks and is our main variable of 
interest. Y ,  is a vector of rating-specific variables that includes INTERNAL, a binary variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the rating downgrade is due to internal reasons, and 0 if the rating downgrade is 
due to external reasons, RATING, defined as the bank’s rating prior to the rating downgrade on a 
23 step numerical scale (AAA/Aaa=23, AA+/Aa1=22,…, C and lower=1), NOTCHES, defined in 
line with Bannier and Hirsch (2010) as the absolute difference between the old and new rating 
                                                 
19 During our investigation period the composition of the three largest banks in each country is comparatively con-
sistent and there are only few instances where a bank ceases to be TBTF according to our definition and is replaced 
by a different bank. These instances do not affect our results. 
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based on the 23 step numerical scale, REVIEW, which equals 1 if the rating change was preceded 
by a rating review, and equals 0 otherwise, and INVESTMENT TO NON-INVESTMENT DOWN-
GRADE, which equals 1 if the rating downgrade resulted in a non-investment grade status of the 
bank (e.g. BBB-/Baa3 and above to BB+/Ba1 and below). 
,  is a vector of event-specific variables, including S&P and FITCH, both equal to 1 if the down-
grade announcement was made by S&P or Fitch, respectively, and 0 otherwise, and CRISIS, equal 
to 1 if the event occurred between January 2008 and December 2009, the height of the recent 
financial crisis, and 0 otherwise. Z ,  is defined as a vector of bank-specific variables that includes OPAQUENESS, which is defined 
similarly as in Morgan (2002) and Bannier, Behr and Güttler (2010): it takes the value of 0 if the 
bank has a rating by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, 1 if the banks has a rating by two of the three CRAs, 
and 2 if the bank is rated by only one CRA20. As financial institutions are considered to be opaque 
compared to other firms (see e.g., Morgan, 2002; Hirtle, 2006), we introduce this variable to test 
whether differences in opaqueness matter. Further bank-specific variables are ROA, defined as the 
bank’s return on assets (ROA) in the year prior to the rating announcement, LEVERAGE, defined 
as the ratio of total liabilities to total equity of the bank at the end of the year prior to event, 
LIQUIDITY, defined in analogy to Kapadia and Pu (2012) as the ratio of non-zero daily CDS 
spread changes to the total number of trading days during the 120-day estimation period,21 and 
LIABILITIES/GDP, which is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the ratio of the bank’s total 
liabilities divided by the GDP of the bank’s country of origin in the year prior to the event exceeds 
                                                 
20 Morgan (2002) and Bannier et al. (2010) use split ratings between the CRAs, while we differentiate between the 
number of available ratings as a proxy for opaqueness. However, we also ran the regression using split ratings and 
analyst coverage as measures of opaqueness. The results remain unchanged. 
21 Further tests showed that there is no significant difference in the liquidity measure between estimation period and 
the event window or between TBTF and non-TBTF banks. 
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0.5, and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the systemic importance of a bank and for potential 
to Too-Big-to-be-Rescued considerations (see e.g., Völz and Wedow, 2011; Cubillas et al., 2017). 
The balance sheet data and a bank’s ROA are taken from Bankscope and GDP data is obtained 
from the World Bank database. Additional bank-specific variables include GOVERNMENT, which 
is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is a policy bank or the government holds 
significant stake in the bank (e.g., Royal Bank of Scotland following a capital injection by the 
British government in October 2008), and 0 otherwise, IB, which is equal to 1 if the bank’s first 
two digits of the SIC code start with 62, and 0 otherwise, and EU, equal to 1 if the firm’s head-
quarter is located in Europe, and 0 otherwise. The variable IB essentially captures investment 
banks and asset managers, while EU accounts for the fact that European governments provided 
blanket guarantees to depositors and creditors of ailing financial institutions during the crisis, po-
tentially reinforcing existing TBTF considerations. 
Table 6 shows the regression results.22 Models 1 through 3 show the regression results using the 
[-10;+10] day CASC of bank i, while Models 4 to 6 show the results using the [-5;+5] day CASC. 
The interaction term TBTF X INTERNAL is negative and highly significant in all model specifica-
tions, providing robust evidence that the CDS spreads of TBTF banks are considerably less af-
fected by rating downgrades than those of non-TBTF banks. It is also noteworthy that the effect 
of TBTF is most pronounced when using the variable TBTF1, as the coefficient for this variable is 
larger compared to the coefficients for TBTF and TBTF5. In line with expectations, the more banks 
are included in the definition of TBTF, the lower the coefficient, with the coefficient for 
                                                 
22 The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses are presented in Table A.6 in the Appendix. 
We also ran the same regressions only using the sample of 242 observations for internal reasons. The results are 
presented in Table A.7 in the Appendix and further support the results for the overall sample. 
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TBTF5 X INTERNAL generally being the lowest, showing that only the largest banks in a country 
benefit most from TBTF considerations. 
The rating-specific variables also have a significant influence on the observed CDS spread 
changes. The coefficient for INTERNAL is highly significant and positive in all models, further 
confirming that rating changes due to internal reasons lead to a significant widening of CDS 
spreads for non-TBTF banks (this is also in line with the CDS development observed in Figure 3 
Panel A). Furthermore, the coefficient for RATING is negative and significant in all model speci-
fications, indicating that a higher rating is associated with lower CDS spread changes. In addition, 
the coefficient for the variable REVIEW is likewise negative in all model specifications, but only 
significant in the first three model specifications. These estimates show that a rating review prior 
to the rating downgrade announcement leads to a significantly lower CDS market reaction, sug-
gesting that CDS market participants may have anticipated the rating change. The coefficient for 
NOTCHES is positive and significant in all model specifications. In line with expectations, rating 
downgrades over several notches lead to a more significant widening of CDS spreads. In contrast, 
the variable INVESTMENT TO NON-INVESTMENT DOWNGRADE is not significant in any of 
the model specifications. 
[Please insert Table 6 around here] 
Among the event-specific variables, only the coefficient for CRISIS is significant in Models 4 
through 6. The positive sign of the coefficient documents that CDS spreads of financial institutions 
widened significantly if the rating downgrade occurred during the recent financial crisis.23 The 
                                                 
23 Instead of the CRISIS variable we also ran the regressions with year fixed effects. The results remain qualitatively 
the same. 
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coefficients for the other event-specific variables lack significance, indicating that the CRA that 
announced the downgrade does not influence the observed CDS spreads surrounding a rating 
change. 
With respect to the bank-specific variables, the coefficient for the variable LIABILITIES/GDP is 
positive and significant in several of the regression models. This provides some evidence that Too-
Big-to-be-Rescued considerations may also have an effect on CDS spreads, as a government 
bailout may not be possible in case of very large banks. In addition, the variable EU is negative 
and at least weakly significant in all model specifications, indicating that European banks’ CDS 
spreads are less affected by rating downgrades than those of other international financial institu-
tions. This result suggests that market participants anticipate that European banks are more likely 
to receive a bailout in case they face financial difficulty. This expectation was actually fulfilled 
during the financial crisis, as European governments provided blanket guarantees to depositors 
and creditors to failing European financial institutions or those facing severe funding and liquidity 
shortages.24 The other bank-specific variables have no influence on the observed CDS spread 
changes, as their coefficients are insignificant.25 
Overall, TBTF considerations appear to have a significant effect on CDS spread changes surround-
ing credit rating downgrades, even after controlling for other potential influence factors. This pro-
vides further evidence that market discipline mechanisms, such as credit rating downgrades, do 
not appear to work for financial institutions that are perceived to be TBTF and that markets assume 
                                                 
24 Even in 2017, almost a decade after the end of the financial crisis, particularly European governments still prefer to 
bail out financial institutions rather than letting them go bankrupt, even if they are not TBTF (e.g., Italy in 2017 
(Financial Times, 2017)). 
25 We also ran the regressions dropping all observations where the variable GOVERNMENT is equal to 1, as banks 
with partial government ownership may be regarded as TBTF simply due the government’s involvement. The results 
are largely unchanged. 
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implicit government guarantees. Even if the creditworthiness of these institutions deteriorates and 
their credit rating is lowered, this does not lead to a corresponding widening in CDS spreads, 
giving TBTF banks a clear advantage over non-TBTF banks in refinancing and funding operations. 
Therefore, the enforcement of regulatory discipline appears to be of particularly importance for 
TBTF banks. Nonetheless, some of the rating-specific variables, such as the number of notches a 
rating was downgraded, rating review announcements prior to the rating change, and the bank’s 
prior rating, still possess a significant influence on CDS spreads. In contrast, event-specific and 
bank-specific variables have a limited impact at best on the observed CDS spread changes sur-
rounding rating downgrades.26 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1 Stock and bond market reactions 
We conduct an equity and bond event study to test whether these markets react in a similar fashion 
to the CDS market to bank rating changes.27 The results of the stock and bond event study are 
shown in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. The stock event study documents for the sample of 
606 events that rating downgrades are generally perceived as negative events and that downgrades 
due to internal reasons lead to more pronounced negative reactions than those for external reasons. 
This corroborates the results of the CDS event study. Further differentiating downgrades due to 
internal reasons into those for TBTF and non-TBTF banks shows that the reaction is similar, even 
                                                 
26 We also ran the regression removing the countries with the least observations from our sample in order to compare 
TBTF and non-TBTF firms in the same country as there may not be enough counterfactual non-TBTF firms with 
rating downgrade information in smaller countries. We drop the observations from Kazakhstan (3 observations), Den-
mark (2), Canada, Norway, Russia, Korea, Turkey (1 each) from our sample and repeated the OLS regression. We 
find that the results remain qualitatively the same. 
27 Compared to the analysis using CDS spreads, the number of events is lower for the stock and bond event studies as 
not all sample banks are listed on a stock exchange and not all banks had bond data in sufficient quality available. For 
reasons of brevity, the stock and bond event study methodologies are described in more detail in Appendix B. 
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though the overall stock price development is less negative for TBTF banks than non-TBTF banks 
during the [−10;+10] day event window. The negative returns indicate that stockholders may ben-
efit less from potential TBTF considerations, as debt and credit providers are usually the direct 
beneficiaries of a bailout. In addition, the results indicate that the stock market reaction is largely 
confined to the short term event windows as only these event windows show significant returns. 
[Please insert Table 7 around here] 
The results of the bond event study for the sample of 524 events are presented in Table 8 and show 
that rating downgrades are generally perceived to be negative events, as bond prices experience a 
small but significant drop in value. This further supports the results of the CDS event study. Dif-
ferentiating the sample of downgrades due to internal reasons again into TBTF and non-TBTF 
banks shows that there is no meaningful bond reaction for TBTF banks during the [−10;+10] day 
event window, while for non-TBTF banks a significant decline in bond prices can be observed. 
The difference is significant for the [−5;+5] day event window. This result provides further con-
firmation of the reaction observed in the CDS market and offers additional support that particularly 
debt and credit markets take TBTF considerations into account. 
[Please insert Table 8 around here] 
The results for the stock and bond event study are a graphically illustrated in Figure 4. The graphics 
show that stock as well as bond markets react to rating downgrades, particularly if they are due to 
internal reasons. Furthermore, the difference between TBTF and non-TBTF banks is persistent 
and in line with the observations of the CDS market. Therefore, TBTF considerations appear to 
play an important role in all three markets, whereby TBTF considerations are more prevalent in 
the CDS and bond market than the stock market. 
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[Please insert Figure 4 around here] 
5.2 CDS market reaction to rating review announcements 
Rating changes are usually carefully deliberated by CRAs and their ratings are supposed to look 
through the business cycle to ensure a certain degree of rating stability (Löffler, 2004). This, how-
ever, raises concerns with regard to the timeliness of credit rating changes. In this context, rating 
reviews allow CRAs to provide market participants with more timely information with respect to 
the creditworthiness of a firm, without resorting to direct rating changes (Boot, Milbourn and 
Schmeits, 2006).28 Therefore, in order to alleviate concerns with respect to the timeliness of rating 
changes, we also look at the effect of rating review announcements on banks’ CDS spread 
changes.29 
To obtain our sample for rating reviews, we start with the 1,029 rating review announcements that 
we collected from the websites of the three major CRAs and employ the same selection procedure 
as described in Section 2.1. We focus on rating reviews for downgrades, which leaves us with a 
final sample of 446 review announcements. 
For the entire sample of rating reviews for downgrade, a significant widening of banks’ CDS 
spreads can be observed (see Table A.9 in the Appendix). Splitting the sample into reviews for 
downgrade due to internal reasons) and external reasons leads to similar results as for the respec-
                                                 
28 The three major CRAs, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch use different terminologies to describe the rating review process: 
S&P places a firm on “CreditWatch”, while Moody’s places a firm’s rating on “Watchlist”, and Fitch on “Rating 
Watch”. 
29 Prior research shows that CDS spreads widen following rating reviews for downgrade, analogous to rating down-
grades, with most studies finding that review announcements have a similar effect to actual rating downgrades (see 
e.g., Hull et al., 2004; Norden and Weber, 2004; Galil and Soffer, 2011). For rating reviews for upgrade, the results 
are ambiguous, with Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) failing to observe significant CDS market move-
ments following rating reviews for upgrade, while Galil and Soffer (2011) document that rating reviews for upgrade 
lead to a significant tightening of CDS spreads. 
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tive rating downgrade announcements. Our prior result that CDS market participants react differ-
ently to rating announcements attributed to internal and external reasons is confirmed (see also 
Figure A.3 in the Appendix). The reaction to rating review for downgrade announcements, how-
ever, is overall less pronounced than for actual downgrade announcements. 
5.3 Alternative methodologies and model specifications 
We use multiple methodology modifications to further validate our results. As an alternative to the 
CDS event study methodology described in Section 2.2, we use benchmark adjusted CDS spread 
changes, an empirical set up that follows Hull et al. (2004), Jorion and Zhang (2007), and Norden 
(2017). This methodology adjusts the observed CDS spread changes by deducting the changes of 
a CDS spread index of the same rating class as the bank’s initial rating using the equation: 
, ,  (5)
where  is the adjusted CDS spread change of bank i on day t, ,  is the observed CDS 
spread of bank i on day t and It is the relevant CDS spread index for the rating class on day t.30 
This methodology is well suited for internal reasons, as these rating announcements focus on one 
bank only, thereby avoiding distortions in the benchmark index due to multiple banks being af-
fected simultaneously, as often happens for external reasons. We therefore limit our examination 
to rating downgrades due to internal reasons. The results are line with those described in Section 
                                                 
30 The daily CDS spread index corresponds to the equally weighted cross-sectional mean of all CDS spreads for each 
of the six letter rating classes AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC or below, and is composed of the CDS spreads of 
all banks with available data through Thomson Reuters EOD and a long-term issuer rating of either S&P, Moody’s, 
or Fitch, excluding the event firm. AAA and AA rated banks are combined into one rating class, due to the small 
sample size of these firms. Our approach with respect to the benchmark also implies that the benchmark for each event 
is composed of all banks that have a rating by the CRA that announced the rating change (e.g., rating announcements 
by Moody’s are compared with a benchmark consisting only of banks with a rating by Moody’s). 
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4.31 We again document that for TBTF banks rating downgrade announcements do not influence 
their CDS spreads, while the CDS spreads of non-TBTF banks widen significantly. 
In addition, we test whether our results hold when using subordinated CDS spreads instead of 
senior ones. Even though, the five-year tenor is the most liquid trading segment in the CDS market, 
traders and bank supervisors may also focus on information contained in CDS spreads on subor-
dinate bank debt given that they are more risk-sensitive. We find that our results are consistent 
when using the five-year subordinated CDS, as we only observe a significant market reaction for 
non-TBTF banks but not for TBTF ones.32 
With respect to our regression models, for the sub-sample of internal rating changes, we interact 
the TBTF variable with a set of other variables that are potential drivers of the observed CDS 
market reaction to test the robustness of the TBTF variable. This analysis aims to determine 
whether TBTF considerations are the “true” driver of the CDS market reaction to rating down-
grades. To this end we interact TBTF with the standardized variables BANKSIZE, RATING and 
LIQUIDITY, as well as the variables, SOVEREIGN RISK and CDS TRADER. The variable 
BANKSIZE is defined as the banks total assets in billion U.S. dollars at the end of the year prior to 
the rating change and tests whether larger banks in general are more likely to be rescued.33 The 
variable SOVEREIGN RISK is defined as GDP divided by total national debt of the bank’s country 
of origin and captures the possibility that countries with high levels of national debt may not be in 
a financial position to bail out a struggling bank. The variable CDS TRADER is a binary variable 
                                                 
31 The results for market reaction using the benchmark model are shown in Table A.8. 
32 Given the limited data availability for subordinated CDS spreads, our sample for internal rating changes is reduced 
from 242 to 95 observations. Table A.10 provides the results using the five-year subordinated CDS. 
33 BANKSIZE can be used as a variable in our regression analysis as we define TBTF to be banks that are among the 
three largest banks in their country of origin in the year prior to the event. As a result, some large financial institutions 
are not considered TBTF because they are smaller than other banks in their country of origin, even though they may 
still be larger by assets than the three largest banks in another country. 
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equal to 1 if the bank was among the active CDS traders based on quotes submitted by dealers in 
Bloomberg and accounts for the possibility that large banks which are involved in the CDS market 
may try to mitigate any adverse effects to their CDS spreads prior to the rating announcement.34 
The results show for all model specifications that the coefficient for TBTF is statistically signifi-
cant, negative and large, indicating that TBTF considerations are the actual driver behind the ob-
served CDS market reactions (see Table A.11 in the Appendix). This further supports the notion 
that TBTF is the main driver of the CDS market reaction to downgrade announcements and sug-
gests that the reaction of CDS market participants to rating downgrade announcements is driven 
to a large extent by TBTF assumptions. 
5.4 Changes in the regulatory environment 
Following the recent financial crisis, bank regulation was tightened, especially for large, interna-
tional banks with a global footprint. On 4 November 2011 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
released a list of financial institutions whose failure would lead to severe repercussion in the global 
financial system and disrupt the global economy, the so-called G-SIBs. The official acknowledg-
ment of the existence of TBTF institutions may have alleviated concerns around the threat that a 
failure of these institutions potentially pose for the global economy and hence, market discipline 
may play a more prominent role again.35 
We divide our examination period into two sub-periods, one prior to the official G-SIB announce-
ment on 4 November 2011, the pre-G-SIB period, and one following the official announcement, 
                                                 
34 We standardized each variable by deducting the mean value and dividing by the standard deviation of that variable. 
For binary variables, we only deducted the sample mean. 
35 We also split the sample into three different time periods: (i) from 2004 to 2007, (ii) from 2008 to 2009 and (iii) 
from 2010 to 2015 to test whether the results differ prior to the 2008 financial crisis, crisis period and the post-crisis 
period. The difference between TBTF and non-TBTF banks is consistent for all three time periods, but more pro-
nounced during the crisis period (see also Figure A.4 in the Appendix). 
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the post-G-SIB period. We focus our investigation on the sample for internal reasons, which gives 
us a sample of 180 events in the pre-G-SIB period and 62 events in the post-G-SIB period.36 It can 
be seen that CDS spreads widen significantly during both periods (see Table A.12 in the Appen-
dix), even though the widening of CDS spreads is less pronounced during the post-G-SIB period. 
For TBTF banks, no significant CDS market reaction can be observed to rating downgrade an-
nouncements during both time periods. In contrast, for non-TBTF banks, a significant widening 
of CDS spreads can be observed during both investigation periods. Figure A.5 graphically illus-
trates the CDS spread development before and after the official G-SIB designation. It is noteworthy 
that the CDS market reaction appears less pronounced during the period following the official G-
SIB designation, but there is no significant difference in the CDS market reaction of non-TBTF 
banks between the pre- and post-G-SIB period. The same observation is also made for TBTF 
banks. This suggests that there was no significant change in the market participants’ perception of 
the importance of TBTF banks vis-à-vis non-TBTF banks during both periods. 
6. Conclusion 
We analyze the effect of credit rating changes on the CDS spreads of banks to test whether rating 
changes are an appropriate channel through which market discipline can be enforced. To this end, 
we construct a comprehensive sample of 1,081 credit rating change announcements between 2004 
and 2015 for an international sample of financial institutions. 
                                                 
36 Splitting the sample period results into the period prior to the leaked announcement of the G-SIB list on 30 Novem-
ber 2009 by the Financial Times (Financial Times, 2009) and the period following the leaked announcements leads to 
qualitatively similar results with 146 events for the period prior to the leaked list and 96 events following the leaked 
list. As a further robustness check, we control whether the Dodd-Frank act had a significant impact on our results. 
However, the results are similar to the ones reported. 
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Our analyses show that credit rating downgrades are overall associated with a large, significant 
widening of CDS spreads, while rating upgrades are associated with only a small tightening of 
CDS spreads. However, by further dividing our sample into the reasons for the rating change an-
nouncements, we find that the widening of CDS spreads following rating downgrade announce-
ments is entirely driven by downgrades due to internal reasons, such as adverse changes in the 
operating performance or capital structure of the bank. Rating changes due to external reasons, 
such as changes in the economic environment, have almost no effect on banks’ CDS spreads. In 
addition, even though a significant tightening of banks’ CDS spreads can be observed surrounding 
rating upgrades, the effect is negligible compared to rating downgrades. 
We further examine whether the rating downgrades due to internal reasons actually function as a 
proper channel for the enforcement of market discipline on financial institutions. Particularly for 
large banks, TBTF considerations may influence the reaction of CDS market participants to rating 
downgrade announcements, as government bailouts are anticipated if the financial position of these 
institutions deteriorates. In line with this reasoning, we find that CDS spreads of TBTF banks show 
no reaction to rating downgrade announcements. In contrast, non-TBTF banks experience a sig-
nificant widening of CDS spreads surrounding rating downgrades. Even after controlling for other 
factors that potentially influence CDS spread changes, TBTF banks still experience significantly 
smaller spread changes than non-TBTF banks. Similar observations are also made for the stock 
and bond market. Therefore, TBTF banks have limited incentives to curb excessive risk taking as 
market participants do not appear to penalize these banks through a widening of CDS spreads, 
even if the bank’s credit rating is lowered. Simultaneously, TBTF banks have significant refinanc-
ing and funding advantages over their non-TBTF peers. 
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These results provide evidence that for TBTF banks, rating downgrades are not an appropriate 
mechanism through which market discipline can be enforced on these institutions, given market 
participants’ assumption of implicit government guarantees. This shows the importance of regula-
tory discipline as the main tool for controlling the risk taking of TBTF banks and raises the ques-
tion whether markets can be expected to effectively discipline large, globally interconnected fi-
nancial institutions. 
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Table 1: Sample selection procedure 
This table shows the sample selection procedure for the rating change announcements of banks during the investigation period from January 2004 
to December 2015. The final sample is used for the empirical analyses of CDS spread changes throughout the main analyses. 
 Downgrades Upgrades Total 
Initial sample 2,186 1,207 3,393 
Less rating review announcements -762 -267 -1,029 
Less no CDS data -369 -527 -896 
Less insufficient CDS liquidity -153 -63 -216 
Less “other” reasons -4 -0 -4 
Less missing accounting data -116 -51 -167 
Final sample 782 299 1,081 
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Table 2: Reasons for rating change announcements by year 
This table shows the reasons for rating change announcements for the entire sample of 1,081 observations during the investigation period from 
January 2004 to December 2015. The reasons for bank rating changes are divided into internal reasons, which are within the control or influence 
of the firm, and external reasons, over which the firm has no influence. Internal reasons include rating changes as a result of changes in capital 
structure, operating performance, or M&A activity. External reasons include rating changes due to changes in the macroeconomic or regulatory 
environment, adjustments to the sovereign rating, and changes in the methodology the CRA uses to assess the ratings of banks. 
 Internal reasons External reasons  




M&A Environment Sovereign Methodology Total 
Panel A: Rating downgrade announcements 
2004 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 
2005 3 4 3 0 0 0 10 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 5 13 1 10 0 2 31 
2008 14 38 5 30 6 0 93 
2009 13 37 10 60 20 1 141 
2010 2 10 2 22 22 0 58 
2011 9 11 0 36 82 29 167 
2012 8 8 0 47 57 4 124 
2013 8 15 0 6 23 0 52 
2014 9 6 0 6 17 0 38 
2015 4 2 1 28 23 7 65 
Total  75 145 22 247 250 43 782 
Panel B: Rating upgrade announcements 
2004 3 4 0 2 1 0 10 
2005 1 8 3 0 8 0 20 
2006 8 21 12 1 5 0 47 
2007 4 19 1 1 7 42 74 
2008 0 1 5 0 4 0 10 
2009 0 0 1 0 3 2 6 
2010 1 5 0 0 10 0 16 
2011 2 3 1 0 5 11 22 
2012 6 0 1 1 3 0 11 
2013 4 2 0 1 9 0 16 
2014 4 7 1 1 10 2 25 
2015 2 1 0 8 3 28 42 
Total  35 71 25 15 68 85 299 
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Table 3: CDS market reaction to rating downgrade announcements 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the entire sample of 782 rating downgrade announcements (Panel A), divided 
into downgrade announcements due to internal reasons (Panel B) and external reasons (Panel C). The short-term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], 
and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction surrounding the rating downgrade announcement. In 
addition, the [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for potential information leakage prior to the announcement and to 
account for adjustments to CDS spreads following the official announcement, respectively. The mean and median cumulative adjusted CDS spread 
changes (CASC) are shown in basis points (bps) and tested for significance using the parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test (Wilcoxon). The equality of means and medians of rating downgrade announcements due to internal and external reasons are tested for 
statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test (Panel D). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: All rating downgrade announcements 
[-10;+10] 6.641 -0.585 1.221 -0.862 782 405 : 377 
[-5;+5] 12.315 -0.684 2.732*** -0.584 782 405 : 377 
[-1;+1] 6.906 -0.448 2.274** -0.691 782 421 : 361 
[0;0] 3.488 -0.122 2.856*** 0.105 782 414 : 368 
[-5;-1] 6.600 0.231 2.624*** 0.586 782 380 : 402 
[+1;+5] 2.227 -0.139 0.750 -0.577 782 396 : 386 
Panel B: Rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons 
[-10;+10] 44.203 6.787 3.451*** 3.189*** 242 99 : 143 
[-5;+5] 50.527 8.116 4.154*** 4.199*** 242 94 : 148 
[-1;+1] 20.612 1.394 2.355** 2.075** 242 109 : 133 
[0;0] 5.781 0.703 2.546** 2.541** 242 98 : 144 
[-5;-1] 17.000 1.672 2.738*** 1.963** 242 105 : 137 
[+1;+5] 27.746 2.773 3.651*** 4.040*** 242 101 : 141 
Panel C: Rating downgrade announcements due to external reasons 
[-10;+10] -10.193 -4.070 -1.942* -3.152*** 540 306 : 234 
[-5;+5] -4.809 -3.837 -1.435 -3.686*** 540 311 : 229 
[-1;+1] 0.763 -1.305 0.393 -2.276** 540 312 : 228 
[0;0] 2.461 -0.491 1.702* -1.716* 540 316 : 224 
[-5;-1] 1.939 -0.166 0.833 -0.657 540 275 : 265 
[+1;+5] -9.209 -1.059 -3.712** -3.550*** 540 295 : 245 
Panel D: Difference between rating downgrade announcements due to internal and external reasons 
 Δ Mean  
CASC (bps) 
Δ Median  
CASC (bps) 
two sample t-test  
(t-value) 
Mann Whitney U test 
(Z-Score) 
[-10;+10] 54.397 10.857 4.683*** 4.410*** 
[-5;+5] 55.336 11.953 5.792*** 5.613*** 
[-1;+1] 19.849 2.699 3.038*** 2.951*** 
[0;0] 3.320 1.194 1.257 3.091*** 
[-5;-1] 15.060 1.838 2.780*** 2.100** 
[+1;+5] 36.955 3.831 5.874*** 5.356*** 
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Table 4: CDS market reaction to rating upgrade announcements 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the entire sample of 299 rating upgrade announcements (Panel A), divided 
into upgrade announcements due to internal reasons (Panel B) and external reasons (Panel C). The short-term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], 
and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction surrounding the rating upgrade announcement. In 
addition, the [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for potential information leakage prior to the announcement and to 
account for adjustments to CDS spreads following the official announcement, respectively. The mean and median cumulative adjusted CDS spread 
changes (CASC) are shown in basis points (bps) and tested for significance using the parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test (Wilcoxon). The equality of means and medians of rating upgrade announcements due to internal and external reasons are tested for 
statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test (Panel D). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: All rating upgrade announcements 
[-10;+10] 0.896 0.253 0.962 1.925* 299 137 : 162 
[-5;+5] -1.302 -0.146 -1.787* -1.103 299 160 : 139 
[-1;+1] -1.783 -0.223 -2.598*** -2.887*** 299 174 : 125 
[0;0] -1.139 -0.064 -2.605*** -3.110*** 299 165 : 134 
[-5;-1] 0.338 0.177 0.791 1.858* 299 128 : 171 
[+1;+5] -0.501 -0.050 -0.827 -0.588 299 158 : 141 
Panel B: Rating upgrade announcements due to internal reasons 
[-10;+10] 3.014 0.687 2.785*** 2.440** 131 51 : 80 
[-5;+5] 0.965 0.148 1.382 0.930 131 60 : 71 
[-1;+1] -0.290 -0.155 -0.835 -1.259 131 74 : 57 
[0;0] -0.519 -0.096 -2.817*** -2.640*** 131 77 : 54 
[-5;-1] 0.482 0.317 1.028 1.564 131 55 : 76 
[+1;+5] 1.002 0.050 1.541 0.847 131 62 : 69 
Panel C: Rating upgrade announcements due to external reasons 
[-10;+10] -0.756 -0.159 -0.534 0.480 168 86 : 82 
[-5;+5] -3.069 -0.433 -2.645*** -2.177** 168 100 : 68 
[-1;+1] -2.948 -0.313 -2.487** -2.679*** 168 100 : 68 
[0;0] -1.622 -0.016 -2.124** -1.854* 168 88 : 80 
[-5;-1] 0.226 0.096 0.338 1.092 168 73 : 95 
[+1;+5] -1.673 -0.288 -1.773* -1.481 168 96 : 72 
Panel D: Difference between rating upgrade announcements due to internal and external reasons 
 Δ Mean  
CASC (bps) 
Δ Median  
CASC (bps) 
two sample t-test  
(t-value) 
Mann Whitney U test 
(Z-Score) 
[-10;+10] 3.771 0.847 2.019** 1.215 
[-5;+5] 4.034 0.581 2.778** 2.273** 
[-1;+1] 2.657 0.158 1.929* 1.203 
[0;0] 1.104 -0.080 1.254 -0.431 
[-5;-1] 0.256 0.220 0.297 0.150 
[+1;+5] 2.674 0.338 2.205** 1.627 
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Table 5: CDS market reaction to rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons 
for TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the sample of 242 rating downgrade announcements attributed to internal 
reasons, divided into downgrade announcements for TBTF banks (Panel A) and non-TBTF banks (Panel B). A bank is defined as TBTF if it was 
among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade announce-
ment. The short-term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction 
surrounding the rating downgrade announcement. In addition, the [-30;-11], [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for 
potential information leakage prior to the announcement and to account for adjustments to CDS spreads following the official announcement, 
respectively. The mean and median cumulative adjusted CDS spread changes (CASC) are shown in basis points (bps) and tested for significance 
using the parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon). The equality of means and medians of rating upgrade 
announcements due to internal and external reasons are tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test 
(Panel C). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: TBTF banks 
[-30;-11] 9.731 7.098 1.498 1.842** 80 33 : 47 
[-10;+10] -6.876 1.004 -0.908 -0.336 80 39 : 41 
[-5;+5] 2.753 2.617 0.443 0.101 80 37 : 43 
[-1;+1] 4.342 0.810 1.373 0.624 80 36 : 44 
[0;0] 1.393 0.588 0.972 1.439 80 33 : 47 
[-5;-1] -4.384 -0.013 -1.448 -1.007 80 40 : 40 
[+1;+5] 5.744 0.337 1.234 0.691 80 39 : 41 
Panel B: Non-TBTF banks 
[-30;-11] -8.719 4.782 -0.677 1.100 162 70 : 92 
[-10;+10] 69.428 12.384 3.760*** 3.963*** 162 60 : 102 
[-5;+5] 74.119 15.894 4.203*** 4.816*** 162 57 : 105 
[-1;+1] 28.647 1.731 2.212** 2.031** 162 73 : 89 
[0;0] 7.948 0.911 2.403** 2.126** 162 65 : 97 
[-5;-1] 27.559 4.984 3.045*** 2.871*** 162 65 : 97 
[+1;+5] 38.611 5.716 3.500*** 4.228*** 162 62 : 100 
Panel C: Difference between TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
 Δ Mean  
CASC (bps) 
Δ Median  
CASC (bps) 
two sample t-test  
(t-value) 
Mann Whitney U test 
(Z-Score) 
[-30;-11] 18.450 2.316 0.976 0.159 
[-10;+10] -76.304 -11.380 -2.843*** -3.054*** 
[-5;+5] -71.366 -13.277 -2.799*** -3.321*** 
[-1;+1] -24.305 -0.921 -1.308 -0.879 
[0;0] -6.555 -0.323 -1.360 -0.403 
[-5;-1] -31.943 -4.996 -2.445** -2.691*** 
[+1;+5] -32.867 -5.379 -2.048** -2.371** 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928113 
42 
Table 6: Regression results for rating downgrade announcements 
This table shows the regression results for the sample of the 782 rating downgrades attributed to internal and external reasons. The dependent 
variable is bank i’s mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) either during the [-10;+10] (CASCi,[-10;+10]) or [-5;+5] (CASCi,[-5;+5]) day 
event window. TBTF, TBTF1, and TBTF5 are binary variables equal to 1 if a bank was among the three largest, the largest, or among the five largest 
banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating change announcement, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. INTERNAL is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the rating downgrade is due to internal reasons and 0 if the rating downgrade 
is due to external reasons. RATING is defined as the bank’s rating prior to the rating downgrade on a 23 step numerical scale (AAA/Aaa=23, 
AA+/Aa1=22,…, C and lower=1), NOTCHES is defined as the absolute difference between the old and new rating based on the 23 step numerical 
scale, REVIEW is equal to 1 if the rating change was preceded by a rating review and 0 otherwise and INVESTMENT TO NON-INVESTMENT 
DOWNGRADE is equal to 1 if the rating downgrade resulted in a non-investment grade status of the bank (e.g. BBB-/Baa3 and above to BB+/Ba1 
and below), and 0 otherwise. S&P and FITCH are both equal to 1 if the downgrade announcement was made by S&P or Fitch, respectively, and 0 
otherwise, and CRISIS takes the value 1 if the event occurred between January 2008 and December 2009 and 0 otherwise. OPAQUENESS takes 
the value of 0 if the bank has a rating by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, 1 if the banks has a rating by only two of the three CRAs, and 2 if the bank is 
rated by only one CRA, ROA is defined as the bank’s ROA in the year prior to the rating announcement, LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities 
to total equity of the bank at the end of the year prior to event, LIQUIDITY is the ratio of non-zero daily CDS spread changes to the total number 
of trading days during the 120-day estimation period, and LIABILITIES/GDP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the ratio of the bank’s total liabilities 
divided by the GDP of the bank’s country of origin in the year prior to the event exceeds 0.5 and 0 otherwise, GOVERNMENT is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the bank is a policy bank or the government holds significant stake in the bank and 0 otherwise, IB is equal to 1 if the 
bank’s first two digits of the SIC code start with 62 (e.g., investment banks and asset managers) and 0 otherwise, and EU is equal to 1 if the firm’s 
headquarter is located in Europe and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and given in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable CASCi,[-10;+10] CASCi,[-5;+5] 












































































































































































































































N 782 782 782 782 782 782
Adjusted R2 0.099 0.098 0.098 0.156 0.150 0.155
F-test 2.30*** 2.53*** 2.25*** 2.23*** 2.30*** 2.13***
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Table 7: Stock market reaction to rating downgrade announcements 
This table shows the results for the short-term stock market reaction for the entire sample of 605 rating downgrade announcements (Panel A), 
divided into downgrade announcements due to internal reasons (Panel B) and external reasons (Panel C). Rating downgrade announcements due to 
internal reasons are further divided into TBTF (Panel D) and non-TBTF banks (Panel E). A bank is defined as TBTF if it was among the three 
largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade announcement. The short-
term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction surrounding 
the rating downgrade announcement. In addition, the [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for potential information leakage 
prior to the announcement and to account for stock price adjustments following the official announcement, respectively. The average and median 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are shown in percentage and tested for significance using the parametric, variance-change corrected standard-
ized cross-section test introduced by Boehmer Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), the BMP-test and the nonparametric rank test first introduced by 
Corrado (1989) and later refined by Corrado and Zivney (1992), the CZ-test. The equality of means and medians of rating downgrade announce-
ments due to internal for TBTF and non-TBTF banks are tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test 
(Panel F). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: All rating downgrade announcements 
[-10;+10] -0.74% -0.91% -1.314 -2.806*** 606 326 : 280 
[-5;+5] -1.09% -0.77% -2.239** -2.798*** 606 335 : 271 
[-1;+1] -1.35% -0.75% -4.162*** -3.978*** 606 360 : 246 
[0;0] -0.46% -0.33% -2.671*** -2.602*** 606 339 : 267 
[-5;-1] -0.33% -0.38% -1.225 -1.580 606 327 : 279 
[+1;+5] -0.30% -0.56% -0.635 -1.406 606 333 : 273 
Panel B: Rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons 
[-10;+10] -1.15% -1.13% -0.479 -0.795 156 89 : 67 
[-5;+5] -1.87% -1.15% -1.287 -1.519 156 89 : 67 
[-1;+1] -2.86% -0.96% -3.233*** -3.212*** 156 94 : 62 
[0;0] -0.87% -0.34% -2.084** -2.289** 156 89 : 67 
[-5;-1] -1.03% -0.47% -1.232 -2.064** 156 85 : 71 
[+1;+5] 0.03% -0.34% 0.304 0.835 156 79 : 77 
Panel C: Rating downgrade announcements due to external reasons 
[-10;+10] -0.38% -0.89% -0.948 -2.698*** 450 236 : 214 
[-5;+5] -0.80% -0.69% -1.675* -2.295** 450 245 : 205 
[-1;+1] -0.75% -0.56% -2.369** -2.818*** 450 262 : 188 
[0;0] -0.25% -0.29% -1.393 -1.761* 450 247 : 203 
[-5;-1] 0.01% -0.38% -0.305 -0.728 450 241 : 209 
[+1;+5] -0.56% -0.59% -1.359 -1.887* 450 254 : 196 
Panel D: Rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons TBTF banks 
[-10;+10] -1.09% -2.47% -0.014 0.108 64 39 : 25 
[-5;+5] -2.81% -1.55% -1.413 -2.171** 64 40 : 24 
[-1;+1] -3.13% -1.30% -2.224** -1.621 64 41 : 23 
[0;0] -1.14% -0.46% -1.661* -2.209** 64 41 : 23 
[-5;-1] -1.95% -0.14% -1.373 -2.216** 64 35 : 29 
[+1;+5] 0.28% -0.80% 0.260 -0.017 64 38 : 26 
Panel E: Rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons non-TBTF banks 
[-10;+10] -2.25% -0.62% -1.046 -1.600 92 51 : 41 
[-5;+5] -1.32% -0.84% -0.751 -0.999 92 50 : 42 
[-1;+1] -3.05% -0.94% -2.817*** -3.914*** 92 57 : 35 
[0;0] -0.98% -0.27% -1.939* -1.905* 92 51 : 41 
[-5;-1] -0.87% -0.80% -0.863 -1.499 92 51 : 41 
[+1;+5] 0.53% 0.92% 0.604 0.870 92 41 : 51 
Panel F: Difference between rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons for TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
 Δ ACAR Δ Median  
CAR 
two sample t-test  
(t-value) 
Mann Whitney U test 
(Z-Score) 
[-10;+10] 1.16% -1.85% 0.367 0.027 
[-5;+5] -1.49% -0.71% -0.586 -0.261 
[-1;+1] -0.08% -0.36% -0.044 -0.088 
[0;0] -0.16% -0.20% -0.189 -0.218 
[-5;-1] -1.08% 0.66% -0.514 -0.099 
[+1;+5] -0.25% -1.72% -0.131 -0.463 
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Table 8: Bond market reaction to rating downgrade announcements 
This table shows the results for the short-term bond market reaction for the entire sample of 524 rating downgrade announcements (Panel A), 
divided into downgrade announcements due to internal reasons (Panel B) and external reasons (Panel C). Rating downgrade announcements due to 
internal reasons are further divided into TBTF (Panel D) and non-TBTF banks (Panel E). A bank is defined as TBTF if it was among the three 
largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade announcement. The short-
term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction surrounding 
the rating downgrade announcement. In addition, the [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for potential information leakage 
prior to the announcement and to account for stock price adjustments following the official announcement, respectively. The average and median 
cumulative abnormal bond returns (CABR) are shown in percentage and tested for significance using the parametric t-test, and the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon). The equality of means and medians of rating downgrade announcements due to internal for TBTF and non-
TBTF banks are tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test (Panel F). *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: All rating downgrade announcements 
[-10;+10] -0.233% -0.033% -1.834* -1.468 524 267 : 257 
[-5;+5] -0.301% -0.070% -3.256*** -3.223*** 524 301 : 223 
[-1;+1] -0.218% -0.026% -3.528*** -2.923*** 524 286 : 238 
[0;0] -0.081% -0.013% -2.731*** -3.318*** 524 305 : 219 
[-5;-1] -0.149% 0.006% -2.346** 0.300 524 259 : 265 
[+1;+5] -0.071% -0.054% -1.028 -3.647*** 524 309 : 215 
Panel B: Rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons 
[-10;+10] -0.956% -0.171% -3.314*** -2.898*** 166 94 : 72 
[-5;+5] -0.796% -0.126% -3.831*** -3.189*** 166 100 : 66 
[-1;+1] -0.372% -0.027% -2.324** -1.794* 166 91 : 75 
[0;0] -0.054% -0.010% -0.952 -1.258 166 95 : 71 
[-5;-1] -0.369% 0.000% -2.370** -0.578 166 83 : 83 
[+1;+5] -0.373% -0.076% -3.068*** -2.318** 166 96 : 70 
Panel C: Rating downgrade announcements due to external reasons 
[-10;+10] 0.102% 0.022% 0.807 0.226 358 173 : 185 
[-5;+5] -0.072% -0.048% -0.772 -1.700* 358 201 : 157 
[-1;+1] -0.146% -0.022% -2.850*** -2.292** 358 195 : 163 
[0;0] -0.094% -0.016% -2.703*** -3.191*** 358 210 : 148 
[-5;-1] -0.047% 0.014% -0.812 0.738 358 176 : 182 
[+1;+5] 0.069% -0.052% 0.835 -2.928*** 358 213 : 145 
Panel D: Rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons TBTF banks 
[-10;+10] -0.529% -0.178% -1.699* -1.880* 69 40 : 29 
[-5;+5] -0.318% 0.012% -1.321 -0.619 69 34 : 35 
[-1;+1] -0.045% -0.017% -0.576 -0.774 69 35 : 34 
[0;0] 0.030% -0.009% 0.982 0.182 69 39 : 30 
[-5;-1] -0.174% 0.084% -0.845 1.169 69 30 : 39 
[+1;+5] -0.174% -0.090% -2.048** -2.472** 69 43 : 26 
Panel E: Rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons non-TBTF banks 
[-10;+10] -1.259% -0.158% -2.863*** -2.208** 97 54 : 43 
[-5;+5] -1.135% -0.207% -3.688*** -3.449*** 97 66 : 31 
[-1;+1] -0.604% -0.027% -2.269** -1.668* 97 56 : 41 
[0;0] -0.114% -0.010% -1.208 -1.628 97 56 : 41 
[-5;-1] -0.507% -0.038% -2.283** -1.542 97 53 : 44 
[+1;+5] -0.514% -0.035% -2.594** -1.268 97 53 : 44 
Panel F: Difference between rating downgrade announcements due to internal reasons for TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
 Δ ACAR Δ Median  
CAR 
two sample t-test  
(t-value) 
Mann Whitney U test 
(Z-Score) 
[-10;+10] 0.730% -0.020% 1.249 0.167 
[-5;+5] 0.818% 0.219% 1.957* 2.117** 
[-1;+1] 0.559% 0.010% 1.731* 0.623 
[0;0] 0.144% 0.001% 1.255 1.350 
[-5;-1] 0.334% 0.122% 1.058 1.674* 
[+1;+5] 0.340% -0.055% 1.381 -0.639 
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Figure 1: Total number of bank rating change announcements and average bank rating 
This figure shows the total number of bank rating change announcements during the investigation period from 1st January 2004 to 31st December 
2015 on a quarterly basis. The data is based on 2,364 rating announcements that were collected for the 212 banks in the sample during the investi-
gation period that possessed a long-term issuer rating by S&P, Moody’s and/or Fitch. The figure also shows the average rating of the 212 sample 
banks during the entire investigation period. 
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Figure 2: CDS spread development during the [-10;+10] day event window 
This figure shows the mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) development in basis points (bps) for the entire sample of 782 rating 
downgrade announcements (Panel A) and 299 rating upgrade announcements (Panel B) during the [-10;+10] day event window surrounding the 
rating change announcement t=0. The rating downgrade and rating upgrade announcements are divided into announcements due to internal and 
external reasons. 
Panel A: Rating downgrade announcements Panel B: Rating upgrade announcements 
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Figure 3: CDS spread development during the [-30;+10] day event window for TBTF and 
non-TBTF banks 
This figure shows the mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) development in basis points (bps) for the sample of 242 rating 
downgrades attributed to internal reasons and 540 rating downgrades attributed to external reasons during the [-30;+10] day event window sur-
rounding the rating change announcement t=0, divided into the CASC development for TBTF and non-TBTF banks. A bank is defined as TBTF if 
it was among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade 
announcement. 
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Figure 4: Development of the equity returns and bond returns around rating downgrade 
announcements 
This figure shows the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) and the average cumulative abnormal bond return (ACABR) development in 
percent for the sample of 156 events for the stock event study and 164 events for the bond event study for rating downgrades attributed to internal 
reasons (Panel A) and 450 events for the stock event study and 352 events for the bond event study for rating downgrades attributed to external 
reasons (Panel B) during the [-10;+10] day event window surrounding the rating change announcement t=0. Both samples are divided into the 
ACAR and ACABR development for TBTF and non-TBTF banks. A bank is defined as TBTF if it was among the three largest banks in its country 
of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade announcement. 
Panel A: Internal reasons 
Stocks Bonds 
  































 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928113 
50 
Appendix A: Additional tables and figures 
Table A.1: Years and country statistics 
This table shows the distribution of events for the entire sample of 1,081 rating change announcements during the investigation period from January 
2004 to December 2015 by country. Panel A shows the 782 rating downgrades by country and year and Panel B shows the 299 upgrades by country 
and year. 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
Panel A: Downgrades 
Austria     1 1 3 3 2 8 7 25
Bahrain     1   1
Belgium     2 3 2 2   1 10
Brazil     1 2 6 9
Canada     1 1   2
Denmark     4 3 2    9
France    1 12 4 2 14 12 5  2 52
Germany  1  1 4 2 2 5 4 4 3 7 33
Greece     17 24  3 44
India     1 1  2 4
Ireland     1 13 11 4 1  2 32
Italy  3  2 8 6 26 28 20 5 5 103
Japan    4 3 15 6 11 4  2 3 48
Kazakhstan     1  3 4
Netherlands    1 2 6 3 4 6 3 2 2 29
Norway     1 1    2
Portugal     3 6 12 4 1  1 27
Russian Federation    1 3 1 6 4 15
South Korea     5 1   6
Spain     2 9 2 21 29 2 2 1 68
Sweden    1 5 2    8
Switzerland    2 7 1 3 2 1  1 17
Tunisia     2   2
Turkey     4  4
United Arab Emirates    7   7
United Kingdom 1  4 7 14 2 9 7 2 2 8 56
United States 3 5  17 49 34 18 13 4 2 7 152
Total 3 10  31 93 141 58 167 124 52 38 65 782
Panel B: Upgrades 
Australia        2 9 3 1 1       16
Austria                 2 2
Belgium        1 1    2    4
Brazil           3          3
Canada           1          1
Chile           1          1
China     2 1 2 1 2 1          9
Colombia              1    1
Denmark              2 1 3
France  1 1 5 4    1    12
Germany     2 1 4 2 2    1 4 16
Greece           1 4       5
Hong Kong           1          1
India  1 1 2 4 2 2          12
Ireland     1    3 1    1 3 9
Italy  1 1 9 9    2 4 26
Japan  3 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 16
Malaysia  1 1             2
Netherlands           2 1       1 4
Portugal        1 3    1    5
Russian Federa-
tion  
      3 2 2 2       9
Saudi Arabia           2          2
Singapore           1 2          3
South Korea     5 1 5 5 2 3 2 1 3 27
Spain        2 4 1    7 6 20
Sweden     1    1 1 1 1    4 9
Switzerland        1 2          3
Taiwan           1          1
Turkey           1 2 2 2       7
United Arab 
Emirates  
         1 1          2
United Kingdom  2    3 4 1 3 2    3 7 25
United States  1 4 14 11 2 1 2 2 1 5 43
Total  10 20 47 74 10 6 16 22 11 16 25 42 299
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Table A.2: List of keywords 
This table shows the keywords used to classify the rating announcements, divided into internal reasons (Panel A) and external reasons (Panel B). 
The internal reasons are further subdivided into capital structure, operating performance and M&A, while the external reasons are split into envi-
ronment, sovereign, and methodology. The reason for a rating change by a CRA is identified using a keyword search in the corresponding press 
release. 76 keywords are used which are frequently mentioned as a reason and sorted in order of appearance in the press release. If more than one 
keyword appeared in a press release, the event is attributed to the first keyword, as it is assumed that the most important reason is mentioned first. 
In case a press release did not explicitly include one of the keywords, the reason is manually matched to the closest category. 
Panel A: Internal reasons 
 Capital structure 
  Balance sheet structure, capital structure, credit profile, debt reduction, financial policy, financial position, financial 
profile, financial risk, financial risk profile, financial structure, funding profile, leverage, parent guarantee, risk profile 
 Operating performance 
  Business portfolio, business risk, business risk profile, capital efficiency, cash flow generation, competition, compet-
itiveness, demand, diversification, earnings, efficiency, growth potential, integration, liquidity, market position, oper-
ating environment, operating performance, products, profit margin, profitability, restructuring, retained earnings, 
revenues, sales, trading loss 
 M&A reasons 
  Acquire, acquiring, acquisition, bid, deal, M&A, merged, merger 
Panel A: External reasons 
 Environment 
  Condition, Dodd-Frank, economic downturn, environment, fundamental trends, law, market condition, market devel-
opment, reform, regulation, regulatory, systemic risk 
 Sovereign 
  Authorities, propensity country, financial support, follows the downgrade, follows the revision of, follows the upgrade, 
government, likelihood of a downgrade, provide support, receive support from, sovereign 
 Methodology 
  Current criteria, JDA, methodology, rating criteria, revised bank criteria 
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Table A.3: CDS market reaction to rating downgrade announcements by reason 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the 782 rating downgrade announcements by the reason for the downgrade 
announcements. The reasons are divided into internal reasons and external reasons. The internal reasons include rating changes as a result of changes 
in capital structure (Panel A), operating performance (Panel B), or M&A activity (Panel C). External reasons include rating changes due to changes 
in the macroeconomic or regulatory environment (Panel D), adjustments to the sovereign rating (Panel E), and changes in the methodology the 
CRA uses to assess the ratings of banks (Panel F). The short-term event windows [−10;+10], [−5;+5], and [−1;+1], as well as the announcement 
day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction surrounding the rating downgrade announcement. In addition, the [−5;−1] and [+1;+5] day event 
windows are shown to account for potential information leakage prior to the announcement and to account for adjustments to CDS spreads following 
the official announcement, respectively. The mean and median cumulative adjusted CDS spread changes (CASC) are shown in basis points (bps) 
and tested for significance using the parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon). *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 






Panel A: Rating downgrade announcements due to capital structure reasons
[-10;+10] 36.925 2.351 1.750* 0.956 75 34 : 41
[-5;+5] 55.061 6.993 2.413** 1.732* 75 34 : 41
[-1;+1] 30.664 1.076 1.401 1.500 75 35 : 40
[0;0] 11.757 1.100 2.377** 2.735*** 75 25 : 50
[-5;-1] 11.725 -0.521 0.970 0.026 75 39 : 36
[+1;+5] 31.579 2.760 2.324** 2.698*** 75 30 : 45
Panel B: Rating downgrade announcements due to operating performance reasons
[-10;+10] 51.650 8.022 2.819*** 2.719*** 145 60 : 85
[-5;+5] 51.609 8.174 3.138*** 3.364*** 145 56 : 89
[-1;+1] 16.226 1.203 1.766* 0.899 145 67 : 78
[0;0] 3.077 0.755 1.123 1.089 145 64 : 81
[-5;-1] 20.911 2.297 2.532** 2.054** 145 58 : 87
[+1;+5] 27.621 2.752 2.633*** 2.602*** 145 64 : 81
Panel C: Rating downgrade announcements due to M&A reasons
[-10;+10] 19.938 20.350 1.722* 2.053** 22 5 : 17
[-5;+5] 27.936 9.656 2.204** 2.539** 22 4 : 18
[-1;+1] 15.258 4.170 1.726* 1.802* 22 7 : 15
[0;0] 3.229 0.412 1.085 0.860 22 9 : 13
[-5;-1] 9.203 3.853 2.201** 1.867* 22 8 : 14
[+1;+5] 15.505 3.632 1.638 1.899* 22 7 : 15
External reasons 
Panel D: Rating downgrade announcements due to environment reasons
[-10;+10] -17.292 -3.803 -2.118** -2.592*** 247 143 : 104
[-5;+5] -8.742 -1.919 -1.889* -2.034** 247 143 : 104
[-1;+1] 1.271 -1.319 0.458 -1.862* 247 148 : 99
[0;0] 1.378 -0.333 0.632 -1.750* 247 147 : 100
[-5;-1] 0.413 -0.312 0.147 -0.649 247 129 : 118
[+1;+5] -10.533 0.438 -2.630*** -0.783 247 121 : 126
Panel E: Rating downgrade announcements due to sovereign reasons
[-10;+10] 1.140 -2.786 0.149 -0.990 250 134 : 116
[-5;+5] 4.820 -1.502 0.891 -1.214 250 131 : 119
[-1;+1] 4.315 -0.333 1.421 0.363 250 130 : 120
[0;0] 4.468 -0.469 1.995** -0.008 250 139 : 111
[-5;-1] 4.129 0.025 1.017 -0.533 250 124 : 126
[+1;+5] -3.777 -2.654 -1.115 -2.007** 250 138 : 112
Panel F: Rating downgrade announcements due to methodology changes
[-10;+10] -35.307 -9.064 -3.138*** -3.224*** 43 29 : 14
[-5;+5] -38.203 -35.569 -6.082*** -4.951*** 43 37 : 6
[-1;+1] -22.803 -17.121 -5.776*** -4.637*** 43 34 : 9
[0;0] -2.993 -0.751 -1.898* -1.823* 43 30 : 13
[-5;-1] -2.027 -0.670 -0.324 0.302 43 22 : 21
[+1;+5] -33.183 -16.984 -5.348*** -4.456*** 43 36 : 7
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Table A.4: CDS market reaction to rating upgrade announcements by reason 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the 299 rating upgrade announcements by the reason for the upgrade 
announcements. The reasons are divided into internal reasons and external reasons. The internal reasons include rating changes as a result of changes 
in capital structure (Panel A), operating performance (Panel B), or M&A activity (Panel C). External reasons include rating changes due to changes 
in the macroeconomic or regulatory environment (Panel D), adjustments to the sovereign rating (Panel E), and changes in the methodology the 
CRA uses to assess the ratings of banks (Panel F). The short-term event windows [−10;+10], [−5;+5], and [−1;+1], as well as the announcement 
day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction surrounding the rating upgrade announcement. In addition, the [−5;−1] and [+1;+5] day event 
windows are shown to account for potential information leakage prior to the announcement and to account for adjustments to CDS spreads following 
the official announcement, respectively. The mean and median cumulative adjusted CDS spread changes (CASC) are shown in basis points (bps) 
and tested for significance using the parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon). *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 






Panel A: Rating upgrade announcements due to capital structure reasons
[-10;+10] 2.137 0.390 1.089 1.032 35 13 : 22
[-5;+5] 0.241 0.228 0.136 0.459 35 16 : 19
[-1;+1] -0.701 0.003 -0.814 -0.442 35 17 : 18
[0;0] -0.840 0.001 -1.891* -0.950 35 17 : 18
[-5;-1] 0.904 0.373 0.695 1.491 35 11 : 24
[+1;+5] 0.177 -0.007 0.137 -0.066 35 18 : 17
Panel B: Rating upgrade announcements due to operating performance reasons
[-10;+10] 0.752 0.331 0.829 1.112 71 31 : 40
[-5;+5] 0.005 -0.028 0.008 -0.510 71 36 : 35
[-1;+1] -0.364 -0.268 -1.012 -2.227** 71 47 : 24
[0;0] -0.339 -0.177 -1.865* -2.531** 71 46 : 25
[-5;-1] 0.025 0.070 0.054 0.223 71 35 : 36
[+1;+5] 0.319 -0.004 0.611 -0.123 71 36 : 35
Panel C: Rating upgrade announcements due to M&A reasons
[-10;+10] 10.666 1.710 2.691** 2.328** 25 7 : 18
[-5;+5] 4.705 0.808 2.405** 2.031** 25 8 : 17
[-1;+1] 0.492 0.063 0.533 0.886 25 10 : 15
[0;0] -0.579 -0.179 -1.080 -0.914 25 14 : 11
[-5;-1] 1.188 0.317 1.174 1.429 25 9 : 16
[+1;+5] 4.096 1.033 1.681 2.274** 25 8 : 17
External reasons 
Panel D: Rating upgrade announcements due to environment reasons
[-10;+10] 4.258 3.800 2.410** 2.301** 15 5 : 10
[-5;+5] 1.879 1.543 2.103* 2.034** 15 5 : 10
[-1;+1] -0.391 -0.519 -0.679 1.640 15 10 : 5
[0;0] -0.281 -0.022 -1.226 -0.310 15 8 : 7
[-5;-1] 1.422 1.023 1.790* 2.970*** 15 3 : 12
[+1;+5] 0.738 0.656 0.754 1.640 15 5 : 10
Panel E: Rating upgrade announcements due to sovereign reasons
[-10;+10] -3.975 -0.909 -1.362 -0.629 68 36 : 32
[-5;+5] -5.608 -2.145 -2.247** -2.078** 68 42 : 26
[-1;+1] -5.881 -0.573 -2.183** -1.897* 68 42 : 26
[0;0] -2.636 -0.185 -1.575 -1.693* 68 38 : 30
[-5;-1] 0.279 0.347 0.278 0.327 68 32 : 36
[+1;+5] -3.251 -0.537 -1.509 -0.935 68 39 : 29
Panel F: Rating upgrade announcements due to methodology changes
[-10;+10] 0.933 -0.220 0.633 0.458 85 45 : 40
[-5;+5] -1.912 -0.228 -1.770* -1.854* 85 53 : 32
[-1;+1] -1.052 -0.130 -1.220 -1.864* 85 48 : 37
[0;0] -1.048 0.000 -1.506 -0.620 85 42 : 43
[-5;-1] -0.028 0.063 -0.027 0.437 85 38 : 47
[+1;+5] -0.835 -0.193 -1.231 -1.878* 85 52 : 33
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Table A.5: CDS market reaction to rating downgrade announcements due to external rea-
sons for TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the sample of 540 rating downgrade announcements attributed to external 
reasons, divided into external announcements for TBTF banks (Panel A) and non-TBTF banks (Panel B). A bank is defined as TBTF if it was 
among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade announce-
ment. The short-term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction 
surrounding the rating downgrade announcement. In addition, the [-30;+10], [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for 
potential information leakage prior to the announcement and to account for adjustments to CDS spreads following the official announcement, 
respectively. The mean and median cumulative adjusted CDS spread changes (CASC) are shown in basis points (bps) and tested for significance 
using the parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon).The equality of means and medians of rating upgrade 
announcements due to internal and external reasons are tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test 
(Panel C). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: TBTF banks 
[-30;-11] 10.433 4.933 0.975 1.288 279 130 : 149 
[-10;+10] -1.235 -3.147 -0.206 -1.774* 279 158 : 121 
[-5;+5] 1.178 -1.648 0.308 -1.833* 279 154 : 125 
[-1;+1] 3.299 -1.775 1.343 -1.888* 279 166 : 113 
[0;0] 2.383 -0.755 1.402 -1.959* 279 169 : 110 
[-5;-1] 4.247 -0.162 1.476 -0.557 279 142 : 137 
[+1;+5] -5.453 -0.732 -2.107** -1.703* 279 148 : 131 
Panel B: Non-TBTF banks 
[-30;-11] -12.414 4.923 -0.887 -0.684 261 126 : 135 
[-10;+10] -19.770 -6.584 -2.264** -2.782*** 261 148 : 113 
[-5;+5] -11.211 -6.663 -2.008** -3.344*** 261 157 : 104 
[-1;+1] -1.947 -0.525 -0.642 -1.332 261 146 : 115 
[0;0] 2.544 -0.161 1.069 -0.417 261 146 : 115 
[-5;-1] -0.524 -0.165 -0.141 -0.387 261 132 : 129 
[+1;+5] -13.230 -1.866 -3.066*** -3.304*** 261 147 : 114 
Panel C: Difference between TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
 Δ Mean  
CASC (bps) 
Δ Median  
CASC (bps) 
two sample t-test  
(t-value) 
Mann Whitney U test 
(Z-Score) 
[-30;-11] 22.847 0.009 1.307 1.261 
[-10;+10] 18.535 3.437 1.768* 1.101 
[-5;+5] 12.389 5.015 1.851* 1.596 
[-1;+1] 5.247 -1.250 1.352 -0.242 
[0;0] -0.160 -0.594 -0.055 -1.187 
[-5;-1] 4.772 0.002 1.024 -0.053 
[+1;+5] 7.777 1.134 1.569 1.295 
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Table A.6: Descriptive sample statistics for all rating downgrades  
This table shows the descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression analysis in Table 6 for the sample of the 782 rating downgrades. 
TBTF, TBTF1, and TBTF5 are binary variables defined as 1 if a bank was among the three largest, the largest, or among the five largest banks in 
its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating change announcement, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
INTERNAL is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the rating downgrade is due to internal reasons and 0 if the rating downgrade is due to 
external reasons. RATING is defined as the bank’s rating prior to the rating downgrade on a 23 step numerical scale (AAA/Aaa=23, 
AA+/Aa1=22,…, C and lower=1), NOTCHES is defined as the absolute difference between the old and new rating based on the 23 step numerical 
scale, REVIEW is defined as 1 if the rating change was preceded by a rating review and 0 otherwise and INVESTMENT TO NON-INVESTMENT 
DOWNGRADE is equal to 1 if the rating downgrade resulted in a non-investment grade status of the bank (e.g. BBB-/Baa3 and above to BB+/Ba1 
and below), and 0 otherwise. S&P and FITCH are both equal to 1 if the downgrade announcement was made by S&P or Fitch, respectively, and 0 
otherwise, and CRISIS takes the value 1 if the event occurred between January 2008 and December 2009 and 0 otherwise. OPAQUENESS takes 
the value of 0 if the bank has a rating by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, 1 if the banks has a rating by only two of the three CRAs, and 2 if the bank is 
rated by only one CRA, ROA is defined as the bank’s ROA in the year prior to the rating announcement, LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities 
to total equity of the bank at the end of the year prior to event, LIQUIDITY is the ratio of non-zero daily CDS spread changes to the total number 
of trading days during the 120-day estimation period, and LIABILITIES/GDP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the ratio of the bank’s total liabilities 
divided by the GDP of the bank’s country of origin in the year prior to the event exceeds 0.5 and 0 otherwise, GOVERNMENT is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the bank is a policy bank or the government holds significant stake in the bank and 0 otherwise, IB is equal to 1 if the 
bank’s first two digits of the SIC code start with 62 (e.g., investment banks and asset managers) and 0 otherwise, and EU is equal to 1 if the firm’s 
headquarter is located in Europe and 0 otherwise. 







TBTF 782 0.459 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
TBTF1 782 0.179 0.000 0.384 0.000 0.000 
TBTF5 782 0.582 1.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
Rating-specific variables 
INTERNAL 782 0.309 0.000 0.463 0.000 1.000 
RATING 782 17.537 18.000 3.047 16.000 20.000 
NOTCHES 782 1.353 1.000 0.694 1.000 2.000 
REVIEW 782 0.471 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
INVESTMENT TO NON-INVESTMENT 
DOWNGRADE 
782 0.073 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.000 
Event-specific variables 
S&P 782 0.347 0.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 
FITCH 782 0.229 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.000 
CRISIS 782 0.299 0.000 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Bank-specific variables 
OPAQUENESS 782 0.157 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.000 
ROA 782 0.023 0.322 2.680 -0.026 0.780 
LEVERAGE 782 29.102 15.703 94.701 11.727 25.262 
LIQUIDITY 782 0.112 0.071 0.114 0.035 0.135 
LIABILITIES / GDP 782 0.252 0.000 0.434 0.000 1.000 
GOVERNMENT 782 0.184 0.000 0.388 0.000 0.000 
IB 782 0.095 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.000 
EU 782 0.659 1.000 0.474 0.000 1.000 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928113 
56 
Table A.7: Regression results for rating downgrades due to internal reasons 
This table shows the regression results for the sample of the 242 rating downgrades attributed to internal reasons. The dependent variable is bank 
i’s mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) either during the [-10;+10] (CASCi,[-10;+10]) or [-5;+5] (CASCi,[-5;+5]) day event window. 
TBTF, TBTF1, and TBTF5 are binary variables equal to 1 if a bank was among the three largest, the largest, or among the five largest banks in its 
country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating change announcement, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
RATING is defined as the bank’s rating prior to the rating downgrade on a 23 step numerical scale (AAA/Aaa=23, AA+/Aa1=22,…, C and lower=1), 
NOTCHES is defined as the absolute difference between the old and new rating based on the 23 step numerical scale, REVIEW is equal to 1 if the 
rating change was preceded by a rating review and 0 otherwise, and INVESTMENT TO NON-INVESTMENT DOWNGRADE is equal to 1 if the 
rating downgrade resulted in a non-investment grade status of the bank (e.g. BBB-/Baa3 and above to BB+/Ba1 and below), and 0 otherwise. M&A 
and CAPITAL STRUCTURE are both equal to 1 if the reason for the rating downgrade announcement relate to M&A activity or changes to the 
bank’s capital structure, respectively, and 0 otherwise, S&P and FITCH are both equal to 1 if the downgrade announcement was made by S&P or 
Fitch, respectively, and 0 otherwise, and CRISIS takes the value 1 if the event occurred between January 2008 and December 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
OPAQUENESS takes the value of 0 if the bank has a rating by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, 1 if the banks has a rating by only two of the three CRAs, 
and 2 if the bank is rated by only one CRA, ROA is defined as the bank’s ROA in the year prior to the rating announcement, LEVERAGE is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total equity of the bank at the end of the year prior to event, LIQUIDITY is the ratio of non-zero daily CDS spread changes 
to the total number of trading days during the 120-day estimation period, and LIABILITIES/GDP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the ratio of the 
bank’s total liabilities divided by the GDP of the bank’s country of origin in the year prior to the event exceeds 0.5 and 0 otherwise, GOVERNMENT 
is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is a policy bank or the government holds significant stake in the bank and 0 otherwise, IB 
is equal to 1 if the bank’s first two digits of the SIC code start with 62 (e.g., investment banks and asset managers) and 0 otherwise, and EU is equal 
to 1 if the firm’s headquarter is located in Europe and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and given in parentheses. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable CASCi,[-10;+10] CASCi,[-5;+5] 












































































































































































































































N 242 242 242 242 242 242
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.120 0.120 0.227 0.223 0.223
F-test 2.27*** 1.91** 2.14*** 1.99** 2.06*** 2.00**
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Table A.8: CDS market reaction to rating downgrade announcements using benchmark 
adjusted CDS spread changes 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the sample of 241 rating downgrade announcements attributed to internal 
reasons, divided into downgrade announcements for TBTF banks (Panel A) and non-TBTF banks (Panel B). A bank is defined as TBTF if it was 
among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade announce-
ment. The short-term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction 
surrounding the rating downgrade announcement. In addition, the [-30;-11], [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for 
potential information leakage prior to the announcement and to account for adjustments to CDS spreads following the official announcement, 
respectively. The cumulative adjusted CDS spread changes are calculated by adding daily benchmark adjusted spread changes using ASCi,t = (CDSi,t 
- CDSi,t-1) - (It - It-1), where ASCi,t is the adjusted CDS spread change of bank i on day t, CDSi,t is the observed CDS spread of bank i on day t and It 
is the relevant CDS spread index for the rating class on day t. The daily CDS spread index corresponds to the equally weighted cross-sectional 
mean of all CDS spreads for each of the six letter rating classes AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC and below, composed of the CDS spreads of 
all financial institutions with available data through Thomson Reuters EOD and a long-term issuer rating of either S&P, Moody’s, or Fitch, exclud-
ing the event firm. The mean and median CASC are shown in basis points (bps) and tested for significance using the parametric t-test and the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon). The equality of means and medians of rating downgrade announcements for TBTF and non-
TBTF banks is tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test (Panel C). *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: TBTF banks 
[-30;+10] 6.130 4.095 1.629 2.317** 80 29 : 51 
[-10;+10] 1.337 -0.217 0.245 -0.029 80 41 : 39 
[-5;+5] 3.987 0.100 0.792 0.446 80 40 : 40 
[-1;+1] 2.534 -0.021 1.075 0.249 80 40 : 40 
[0;0] 0.308 0.384 0.332 0.964 80 36 : 44
[-5;-1] -2.267 -0.173 -0.932 -0.408 80 42 : 38 
[+1;+5] 5.946 0.305 1.619 1.525 80 36 : 44 
Panel B: Non-TBTF banks 
[-30;+10] 9.213 4.379 0.372 1.933* 161 68 : 93 
[-10;+10] 58.022 9.832 3.789*** 4.087*** 160 62 : 98 
[-5;+5] 42.982 8.529 4.426*** 4.499*** 160 57 : 103 
[-1;+1] 26.887 0.910 1.614 2.089** 160 76 : 84 
[0;0] 2.439 0.511 1.368 1.419 160 65 : 95 
[-5;-1] 29.025 4.444 3.576*** 3.297*** 161 63 : 98 
[+1;+5] 11.178 0.785 1.773* 2.182** 160 76 : 84 
Panel C: Difference between TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
 Δ Mean  
CASC (bps) 
Δ Median  
CASC (bps)
two sample t-test  
(t-value)
Mann Whitney U test
(Z-Score)
[-30;+10] -3.083 -0.285 -0.088 -0.244 
[-10;+10] -56.685 -10.050 -2.575** -2.698*** 
[-5;+5] -38.995 -8.429 -2.746*** -2.905*** 
[-1;+1] -24.353 -0.931 -1.030 -1.066 
[0;0] -2.130 -0.127 -0.817 -0.251 
[-5;-1] -31.293 -4.617 -2.685*** -2.599*** 
[+1;+5] -5.232 -0.480 -0.563 -0.196 
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Table A.9: CDS market reaction to rating review for downgrade announcements 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the entire sample of 446 rating review for downgrade announcements (Panel 
A), divided into review announcements due to internal reasons (Panel B) and external reasons (Panel C). The short-term event windows [-10;+10], 
[-5;+5], and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction surrounding the rating review for downgrade 
announcement. In addition, the [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for potential information leakage prior to the an-
nouncement and to account for adjustments to CDS spreads following the official announcement, respectively. The mean and median cumulative 
adjusted CDS spread changes (CASC) are shown in basis points (bps) and tested for significance using the parametric t-test and the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon). The equality of means and medians of rating review for downgrade announcements due to internal and 
external reasons are tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test (Panel D). *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: All rating review for downgrade announcements 
[-10;+10] 6.931 0.324 1.520 0.024 446 216 : 230 
[-5;+5] 8.009 3.423 2.335** 2.118** 446 193 : 253 
[-1;+1] 8.585 1.273 4.150*** 4.092*** 446 194 : 252 
[0;0] 4.154 0.360 3.265*** 4.397*** 446 194 : 252 
[-5;-1] 2.074 2.057 0.945 2.720*** 446 193 : 253 
[+1;+5] 1.781 -0.226 0.907 -0.404 446 232 : 214 
Panel B: Rating review for downgrade announcements due to internal reasons 
[-10;+10] 19.163 11.582 2.542** 3.672*** 145 50 : 95 
[-5;+5] 18.554 9.729 3.121*** 3.579 145 53 : 92 
[-1;+1] 11.302 1.520 3.308*** 3.025*** 145 59 : 86 
[0;0] 4.741 0.874 2.643*** 3.090*** 145 55 : 90 
[-5;-1] 11.374 5.204 4.006*** 4.533*** 145 52 : 93 
[+1;+5] 2.439 0.188 0.596 0.571 145 69 : 76 
Panel C: Rating review for downgrade announcements due to external reasons 
[-10;+10] 1.039 -4.285 0.183 -2.553 301 166 : 135 
[-5;+5] 2.929 1.111 0.702 0.081 301 140 : 161 
[-1;+1] 7.276 1.149 2.814*** 2.877*** 301 135 : 166 
[0;0] 3.872 0.183 2.309** 3.210*** 301 139 : 162 
[-5;-1] -2.407 0.764 -0.825 0.299 301 141 : 160 
[+1;+5] 1.464 -0.759 0.683 -0.915 301 163 : 138 
Panel D: Difference between rating review for downgrade announcements due to internal and external reasons 
 Δ Mean  
CASC (bps) 
Δ Median  
CASC (bps) 
two sample t-test  
(t-value) 
Mann Whitney U test 
(Z-Score) 
[-10;+10] 18.125 15.867 1.868* 4.462*** 
[-5;+5] 15.625 8.619 2.142** 2.741*** 
[-1;+1] 4.026 0.371 0.911 0.884 
[0;0] 0.869 0.690 0.320 0.882 
[-5;-1] 13.781 4.440 2.967*** 3.084*** 
[+1;+5] 0.975 0.946 0.232 0.947 
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Table A.10: Subordinated CDS market reaction to rating downgrade announcements due 
to internal reasons for TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the sample of 95 rating downgrade announcements attributed to internal 
reasons, divided into announcements for TBTF banks (Panel A) and non-TBTF banks (Panel B). A bank is defined as TBTF if it was among the 
three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade announcement. The 
short-term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction sur-
rounding the rating downgrade announcement. In addition, the [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for potential information 
leakage prior to the announcement and to account for adjustments to CDS spreads following the official announcement, respectively. The mean 
and median cumulative adjusted CDS spread changes (CASC) are shown in basis points (bps) and tested for significance using the parametric t-
test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon).The equality of means and medians of rating downgrade announcements for 
TBTF and non-TBTF banks are tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test (Panel C). *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 





Panel A: TBTF banks 
[-10;+10] 21.110 14.051 0.858 0.671 50 23 : 27 
[-5;+5] 7.787 3.452 0.617 -0.053 50 24 : 26 
[-1;+1] 3.232 2.649 0.536 0.574 50 21 : 29 
[0;0] -0.826 0.918 -0.336 0.092 50 22 : 28
[-5;-1] -4.343 -0.519 -0.616 -0.661 50 26 : 24 
[+1;+5] 12.956 0.870 1.608 0.352 50 24 : 26 
Panel B: Non-TBTF banks 
[-10;+10] 98.318 25.450 2.995*** 3.121*** 45 15 : 30 
[-5;+5] 68.566 25.822 3.617*** 3.561*** 45 16 : 29 
[-1;+1] 14.214 1.369 2.164** 1.428 45 21 : 24 
[0;0] 0.745 0.277 0.418 0.288 45 21 : 24 
[-5;-1] 34.746 5.061 2.023** 2.918*** 45 15 : 30 
[+1;+5] 33.075 8.646 2.375** 2.500** 45 17 : 28 
Panel C: Difference between TBTF and non-TBTF banks 
 Δ Mean  
CASC (bps) 
Δ Median  
CASC (bps) 
two sample t-test  
(t-value) 
Mann Whitney U test
(Z-Score) 
[-10;+10] -77.208 -11.399 -1.905* -2.106** 
[-5;+5] -60.779 -22.370 -2.718*** -2.814*** 
[-1;+1] -10.982 1.280 -1.234 -0.786 
[0;0] -1.571 0.641 -0.507 -0.183 
[-5;-1] -39.089 -5.580 -2.184** -2.426** 
[+1;+5] -20.119 -7.776 -1.281 -1.793* 
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Table A.11: Regression results for the interaction of TBTF variable with other rating-spe-
cific and bank-specific variables 
This table shows the regression results for the interaction of the TBTF with other rating-specific and bank-specific variables for the sample of the 
242 rating downgrades attributed to internal reasons. The dependent variable is bank i’s mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) 
during the [-10;+10] (CASCi,[-10;+10]) event window (Panel A) and the [-5;+5] (CASCi,[-5;+5]) day event window (Panel B). TBTF is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if a bank was among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating 
change announcement and 0 otherwise. BANKSIZE is defined as the bank’s total assets in billion U.S. dollars at the end of the year prior to the 
event, while RATING is defined as the bank’s rating prior to the rating downgrade on a 23 step numerical scale (AAA/Aaa=23, AA+/Aa1=22,…, 
C and lower=1), LIQUIDITY is defined as the ratio of non-zero daily CDS spread changes to the total number of trading days during the 120-day 
estimation period, SOVEREIGN RISK is defined as GDP divided by total national debt of the bank’s country of origin, and CDS TRADER is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the bank was among the active CDS trader based on quotes submitted by dealers in Bloomberg subtracted by the mean 
number. All variables were standardized by deducting the mean value and dividing by the standard deviation of that variable. For binary variables, 
only the sample mean was deducted. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and given in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 













TBTF × BANKSIZE 56.705* 
(31.072) 
    -11.031 
(45.926) 
TBTF × RATING  62.692** 
(26.457) 
   82.090**
(38.996) 
TBTF × LIQUIDITY   36.098** 
(16.795) 
  11.754 
(19.878) 










    -8.061 
(44.626) 
RATING  -69.524*** 
(25.266) 
   -73.944**
(36.967) 
LIQUIDITY   -36.428** 
(15.548) 
  -9.779 
(18.499) 




















N 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.100 0.045 0.022 0.021 0.087 
F-test 6.46*** 5.56*** 5.79*** 5.16*** 6.45*** 2.57*** 













TBTF × BANKSIZE 47.763 
(29.040) 
    -36.314 
(53.443) 
TBTF × RATING  68.533**
(29.060) 
   92.657***
(43.325) 
TBTF × LIQUIDITY   39.301***
(14.900) 
  7.453 
(18.297) 














   -88.164**
(42.148) 
LIQUIDITY   -32.637**
(13.923) 
  0.763 
(17.190) 
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N 242 242 242 242 242 242 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.116 0.042 0.215 0.021 0.110 
F-test 6.59*** 5.44*** 5.39*** 5.02*** 6.57*** 2.54*** 
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Table A.12: CDS market reaction to rating downgrade announcements for TBTF and non-TBTF banks for the time period 
prior to and following the official G-SIB designation 
This table shows the results of the short-term CDS market reaction for the sample of 242 rating downgrade announcements attributed to internal reasons (Panel A), divided into downgrade announcements 
for TBTF banks (Panel B) and non-TBTF banks (Panel C). The sample is split into the time period prior to the official G-SIB announcement on 4 November 2011, the pre-G-SIB period, and the time 
period following the official announcement, the post-G-SIB period. A bank is defined as TBTF if it was among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of 
the year prior to the rating downgrade announcement. The short-term event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], and [-1;+1], as well as the announcement day [0;0] are shown to capture the market reaction 
surrounding the rating downgrade announcement. In addition, the [-30;-11], [-5;-1] and [+1;+5] day event windows are shown to account for potential information leakage prior to the announcement and 
to account for adjustments to CDS spreads following the official announcement, respectively. The mean and median cumulative adjusted spread changes CASC are shown in basis points (bps) and tested 
for significance using the parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon). The equality of means and medians of rating downgrade announcements during the pre-G-SIB 
period and post-G-SIB period is tested for statistical significance using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test (MWU test). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 

























Panel A: All downgrades 
[-30;-11] -3.384 4.423 -0.290 1.475 180 78 : 102 -0.670 8.391 -0.085 1.490 62 25 : 37 -2.714 -3.968 -0.133 0.279 
[-10;+10] 52.188 7.401 3.084*** 2.364** 180 81 : 99 21.076 6.293 2.374** 3.144*** 62 18 : 44 31.113 1.107 1.061 -0.262 
[-5;+5] 62.971 9.096 3.915*** 3.831*** 180 69 : 111 14.427 5.702 2.084** 1.882* 62 25 : 37 48.544 3.394 1.750* 1.194 
[-1;+1] 26.051 1.150 2.222*** 1.570 180 85 : 95 4.830 1.467 2.076** 1.847* 62 24 : 38 21.221 -0.318 1.058 -0.214 
[0;0] 7.368 1.028 2.431*** 1.993** 180 78 : 102 1.178 0.548 1.323 2.079** 62 20 : 42 6.190 0.481 1.191 0.468 
[-5;-1] 22.535 3.548 2.743*** 1.991** 180 76 : 104 0.941 0.726 0.254 0.347 62 29 : 33 21.594 2.822 1.522 1.068 
[+1;+5] 33.068 3.034 3.296*** 3.223*** 180 82 : 98 12.308 2.773 2.331** 3.123*** 62 19 : 43 20.760 0.262 1.194 -0.073 
Panel B: TBTF banks   
[-30;-11] 15.987 7.098 2.007** 1.847* 54 22 : 32 -3.319 5.038 -0.302 0.673 26 11 : 15 19.307 2.059 1.400 0.745 
[-10;+10] -14.213 -5.543 -1.412 -1.201 54 30 : 24 8.361 7.534 0.847 1.664* 26 9 : 17 -22.574 -13.076 -1.405 -1.433 
[-5;+5] 1.915 4.081 0.228 0.133 54 24 : 30 4.494 -0.393 0.562 -0.038 26 13 : 13 -2.580 4.474 -0.193 0.149 
[-1;+1] 4.060 0.563 0.930 0.142 54 26 : 28 4.928 1.121 1.355 1.181 26 10 : 16 -0.868 -0.558 -0.128 -0.704 
[0;0] 0.626 0.680 0.312 0.607 54 25 : 29 2.987 0.557 2.023* 1.816* 26 8 : 18 -2.361 0.123 -0.769 -0.447 
[-5;-1] -2.014 0.483 -0.627 -0.530 54 26 : 28 -9.307 -0.452 -1.433 -0.927 26 14 : 12 7.293 0.934 1.130 0.673 
[+1;+5] 3.303 -0.914 0.504 -0.504 54 31 : 28 10.815 2.098 2.403** 2.273** 26 8 : 18 -7.512 -3.012 -0.754 -2.060** 
Panel C: Non-TBTF banks   
[-30;-11] -11.686 3.766 -0.718 0.662 126 56 : 70 1.243 8.834 0.112 1.304 36 14 : 22 -12.929 -5.068 -0.416 -0.195 
[-10;+10] 80.646 22.920 3.452*** 3.322*** 126 51 : 75 30.258 6.031 2.251** 2.828** 36 9 : 27 50.387 16.889 1.135 0.353 
[-5;+5] 89.138 26.768 3.993*** 4.304*** 126 45 : 81 21.601 8.686 2.085** 2.545** 36 12 : 12  67.537 18.082 1.600 1.223 
[-1;+1] 35.476 1.731 2.138** 1.689* 126 59 : 67 4.760 1.819 1.550 1.398 36 14 : 22 30.716 -0.088 0.986 0.175 
[0;0] 10.257 1.121 2.428** 1.956* 126 53 : 73 -0.129 0.476 -0.121 1.115 36 12 : 24 10.386 0.645 1.308 0.856 
[-5;-1] 33.056 6.905 2.863*** 2.506** 126 50 : 76 8.342 1.861 2.105** 1.178 36 15 : 21 24.714 5.043 1.136 0.699 
[+1;+5] 45.825 8.417 3.292*** 3.838*** 126 51 : 75 13.387 2.773 1.565 2.168** 36 11 : 25 32.438 5.644 1.224 1.029 
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Figure A.1: CDS spread development during the [−10; +10] day event window by reason 
This figure shows the mean CASC development in bps for the entire sample of 782 rating downgrade announcements and 299 rating upgrade announcements during the [−10; +10] day event window 
surrounding the rating change announcement t = 0 by reason of the rating change announcement. The rating downgrade and rating upgrade announcements are divided announcements due to internal 
reasons (Panel A), and external reasons (Panel B). The internal reasons include rating changes as a result of changes in capital structure, operating performance, or M&A activity. External reasons include 
rating changes due to changes in the macroeconomic or regulatory environment, adjustments to the sovereign rating, and changes in the methodology the CRA uses to assess the ratings of banks. 
Panel A: Internal reasons 
 
Panel B: External reasons 
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Figure A.2: CDS spread development during the [-10;+10] for TBTF and non-TBTF banks by region or country 
This figure shows the mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) development in basis points (bps) for the sample of 242 rating downgrades attributed to internal reasons during the [-10;+10] 
day event window surrounding the rating change announcement t=0, split by region (Asia and Europa) and country (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands) and divided 
into the CASC development for TBTF and non-TBTF banks. A bank is defined as TBTF if it was among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year 
prior to the rating downgrade announcement. 
Asia Europe United States United Kingdom 
    
France Germany Italy The Netherlands 
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Figure A.3: CDS spread development for rating review announcements during the 
[−10;+10] day event window 
This figure shows the mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) development in basis points (bps) for the entire sample of 446 rating 
review for downgrade announcements (Panel A) and 87 rating review for upgrade announcements (Panel B) during the [−10; +10] day event 
window surrounding the rating change announcement t=0. The rating review for downgrade and rating review for upgrade announcements are 
divided announcements due to internal reasons, and external reasons. 
Panel A: Review for downgrade announcements Panel B: Review for upgrade announcements 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928113 
66 
Figure A.4: CDS spread development during different time periods 
This figure shows the mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) development in basis points (bps) for the sample of 242 rating downgrade announcements divided into three different time 
periods: (i) prior to the financial crisis from 2004 to 2008 (pre-crisis period; Panel A), (ii) during the financial crisis from 2008 to 2009 (crisis period; Panel B) and (iii) following the financial crisis from 
2010 to 2015 (post-crisis period ; Panel C) during the [-10;+10] day event window surrounding the rating change announcement t=0. The samples are further divided into TBTF and non-TBTF banks. A 
bank is defined as TBTF if it was among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating downgrade announcement. 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period Panel B: Crisis period Panel C: Post-crisis period 
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Figure A.5: CDS spread development during the [-30;+10] day event window before and 
after the official G-SIB announcement 
This figure shows the mean cumulative adjusted CDS spread change (CASC) development in basis points (bps) for the sample of 180 rating 
downgrade announcements prior to the official announcement of the G-SIB on 4 November 2011, the pre-G-SIB period (Panel A), and for the 
sample of 62 rating downgrade announcements following the official announcement, the post-G-SIB period (Panel B), during the [-30;+10] day 
event window surrounding the rating change announcement t=0. The samples are further split into TBTF and non-TBTF banks. A bank is defined 
as TBTF if it was among the three largest banks in its country of origin as measured by the total assets at the end of the year prior to the rating 
downgrade announcement. 
Panel A: Pre-G-SIB period Panel B: Post-G-SIB period 
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Appendix B: Description of the stock and bond study methodology 
This section provides a brief overview of the methodology used for the bond and stock event study 
described in section 5.1. The stock event study follows the approach as originally described by 
Dodd and Warner (1983) and Brown and Warner (1985) where average cumulative abnormal re-
turns (ACARs) for event i in an event window [τ1; τ2] surrounding the announcement day t=0 are 
calculated by: 
, ; 1 ,  (B.1)
where  is the actually realized return of event bank i on day t, ,  is bank i’s home country 
Datastream benchmark index,  and  are the regression estimates from an OLS of the form 	 ,  using 252 trading day estimation period until t=−11,  is the error term 
and N the number of events. To test whether ACARs differ significantly from 0, we use the para-
metric, variance-change corrected standardized cross-section test introduced by Boehmer, Musu-
meci and Poulsen (1991), the BMP-test and the nonparametric rank test first introduced by Corrado 
(1989) and later refined by Corrado and Zivney (1992), the CZ-test. The difference between two 
samples are tested using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test. 
Abnormal bond returns (ABRs) for bond j are calculated by 
,  (B.2)
where  is bond j’s return on day t and ,  is the return matching benchmark portfolio of 
bonds. We construct daily portfolios of more than 10,000 liquid bonds available from Datastream 
from 2004 to 2015, split by rating (AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC or below) and time to 
maturity tertile (short, medium, long) for a total of 18 portfolios. We use the value-weighted 
matched sum of the portfolio bond returns as this is considered the most appropriate approach 
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(Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu, 2009). All bond returns of event bank i are condensed 
into one abnormal bond return using the valued-weighted sum of all ABRs belonging to that bank 
for event i, using , ∑ ∑ , where  is bond j’s market value as of market 
closing on day t and  binary variable equal to 1 if bond j can be matched to the bank assigned 
to event i, and 0 otherwise, resulting in a market-value weighted portfolio. The average cumulative 
abnormal bond returns (ACABR) during the event window [τ1; τ2] surrounding the announcement 
day t=0 are calculated by: 
, 	 ; 1 ,  (B.3)
where N is the number of events. To test whether ACABRs differ significantly from 0, we use the 
parametric t-test as well as the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The difference between 
two samples are tested using the two sample t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test. 
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Appendix C: Literature on the existence of TBTF 
This appendix briefly summarizes and describes the most prominent empirical studies on TBTF.1 
One of the first studies is by O’Hara and Shaw (1990), who show that there was a largely positive 
equity market reaction to the acknowledgment by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency in 1984 
that the U.S. regulators would not let the largest 11 banks fail. More recently, Moenninghoff, 
Ongena and Wieandt (2015) likewise document positive short-term equity market reactions for 
banks identified in a leaked list of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as being Global Systemi-
cally Important Banks (G-SIBs), which are banks whose failure would lead to severe instability in 
the global financial system. Therefore, these banks are essentially TBTF, as they are expected to 
receive government bailouts to avert a financial crisis. Bongini, Nieri and Pelagatti (2015) likewise 
find an overall positive equity market reaction to the release of the G-SIB methodology by the 
FSB on 19 July 2011 for G-SIBs, particularly for European ones. However, following this initial 
positive reaction, the market reaction turns mostly negative to subsequent FSB announcements as 
the regulation started to take shape and the full regulatory burden became apparent. Nonetheless, 
TBTF assumptions appear to exist in stock markets, as Gandhi and Lustig (2015) document size 
anomalies in the stock returns of U.S. banks, which are in line with the expectation that the share-
holders of the largest banks will be protected through implicit government guarantees. Evidence 
for TBTF can also be found in the options market. Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) 
show that financial sector equity investors in the U.S. benefited from government guarantees in 
the form of a financial sector crash insurance worth up to 282 billion U.S. dollars during the finan-
cial crisis between 2007 and 2009. 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the research on TBTF see also Strahan (2013). 
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There may also be other benefits from being perceived as TBTF. The chairman of HSBC acknowl-
edged prior to the official G-SIB designation that the banks that are officially considered to be of 
systemic importance would likely have a more concentrated flow of business to them (Financial 
Times, 2011b). The Bank of China even viewed its designation as a G-SIB as offering the bank an 
advantage over its domestic peers (Financial Times, 2011a). Moreover, besides obtaining more 
business, benefits of being considered TBTF may be particularly pronounced in debt and credit 
markets. Here, banks potentially benefit from their TBTF status and obtain more favorable refi-
nancing rates. To this end, the then CEO of Deutsche Bank, Josef Ackermann, stated that he was 
glad that Deutsche Bank would likely be considered a G-SIB, as this would lead to benefits with 
regard to its refinancing and depository business (Handelsblatt, 2011). It may therefore well be 
that the perception of being a large, systemically important bank will lead to a comparative ad-
vantage for these institutions, particularly in debt markets with respect to refinancing and funding 
operations. 
In case TBTF banks possess a funding advantage over their non-TBTF banks, this may indicate 
that debt markets do not impose an adequate level of market discipline on large banks. The early 
studies of Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988) and Hannan and Hanweck (1988) point in this di-
rection, as the rates paid on insured certificates of deposit had little relation to risk measures of 
banks and the yields of certificates of deposit issued by larger banks were generally lower than the 
yields of those issued by smaller banks during the 1980s. During the early 1990s, however, inves-
tors started to exert some market discipline as the yields on subordinated debentures of financial 
institutions increased with higher levels of risk (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). Similarly, Morgan 
and Stiroh (2005) document that the bond ratings of the 11 U.S. financial institutions that were 
considered TBTF following the testimony of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency in 1984 were 
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able to issue new debt at significantly lower rates than other banks. There are also indications that 
the costs financial institutions associate with market discipline are lower than the costs they asso-
ciate with regulatory discipline (Billett, Garfinkel and O’Neal, 1998).2 
Rime (2005) finds that TBTF considerations significantly lift a bank’s issuer rating, in some cases 
resulting in a bonus of several rating notches. This rating bonus significantly reduces a bank’s 
refinancing and funding costs, effectively giving these banks a competitive advantage over their 
smaller peers. In a similar vein, Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2013) find that the funding advantage 
of TBTF banks was around 60 bps over their smaller peers at the end of 2007. By the end of 2009 
and in the wake of the financial crisis, this advantage increased to 80 bps. This provides evidence 
that TBTF considerations undermine the effect of market discipline (Rime, 2005). Acharya, An-
giner and Warburton (2016) document that bond credit spreads are not sensitive to risk for large 
financial institutions, while the spreads are sensitive to risk for smaller institutions and non-finan-
cial sector companies. This effectively shows that bondholders of large financial institutions an-
ticipate government bailouts in case of a bank failure, while simultaneously allowing large banks 
to refinance and fund themselves at subsidized rates. As such, empirical research shows that TBTF 
considerations exist, not only in equity, but also in debt markets. Yet, there are also potential 
downsides for a bank to be considered TBTF, such as higher regulatory scrutiny and increased 
regulatory requirements.3 
 
                                                 
2 Other prominent issues with respect to TBTF are the existence of moral hazard issues (Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler, 
2014) and the inability of governments to credibly announce a no bailout policy (Gormley, Johnson and Rhee, 2015). 
In addition, the existence of a TBTF policy leads to distortions in the incentives for mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
among banks, as equity and bond market participants generally view mergers that result in a TBTF banks positively 
(Penas and Unal, 2004; Ongena and Penas, 2009; Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013). 
3 G-SIBs, for example, have higher required levels of Common Equity Tier 1, and are required to have group-wide 
resolution planning and regular resolvability assessments. 
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